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ABSTRACT 
Qublai Khan Ali Mirza “A CLOUD-BASED INTELLIGENT AND ENERGY EFFICIENT 
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The continuity in the financial and other related losses due to cyber-attacks 
prove the substantial growth of malware and their lethal proliferation 
techniques. Every successful malware attack highlights the weaknesses in the 
defence mechanisms responsible for securing the targeted computer or a 
network. The recent cyber-attacks reveal the presence of sophistication and 
intelligence in malware behaviour having the ability to conceal their code and 
operate within the system autonomously. The conventional detection 
mechanisms not only possess the scarcity in malware detection capabilities, 
they consume a large amount of resources while scanning for malicious 
entities in the system. Many recent reports have highlighted this issue along 
with the challenges faced by the alternate solutions and studies conducted in 
the same area. There is an unprecedented need of a resilient and autonomous 
solution that takes proactive approach against modern malware with stealth 
behaviour.  
This thesis proposes a multi-aspect solution comprising of an intelligent 
malware detection framework and an energy efficient hosting model. The 
malware detection framework is a combination of conventional and novel 
malware detection techniques. The proposed framework incorporates 
comprehensive feature heuristics of files generated by a bespoke static feature 
extraction tool. These comprehensive heuristics are used to train the machine 
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learning algorithms; Support Vector Machine, Decision Tree, and Boosting to 
differentiate between clean and malicious files. Both these techniques; feature 
heuristics and machine learning are combined to form a two-factor detection 
mechanism. This thesis also presents a cloud-based energy efficient and 
scalable hosting model, which combines multiple infrastructure components of 
Amazon Web Services to host the malware detection framework. This hosting 
model presents a client-server architecture, where client is a lightweight 
service running on the host machine and server is based on the cloud.  
The proposed framework and the hosting model were evaluated individually 
and combined by specifically designed experiments using separate 
repositories of clean and malicious files. The experiments were designed to 
evaluate the malware detection capabilities and energy efficiency while 
operating within a system. The proposed malware detection framework and 
the hosting model showed significant improvement in malware detection while 
consuming quite low CPU resources during the operation.   
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The current era of technology, which is also known as “the age of data” has 
changed the entire perception about technology. The amount of data 
generated everyday by devices with limited resources is unprecedented and 
the volume of world’s data doubles in every two years [1]. This means that the 
level of security required to protect the data generation and management 
entities is more than it ever was. The recent attacks by a ransomware known 
as “WannaCry”, which shook the infrastructure of many big organizations 
before it was stopped [2], [3] raises the question on the security mechanisms 
that are used to protect the computing infrastructure and sensitive data.  
The samples of recent lethal malware; WannaCry, Petya [4], [5] or Mirai [6] 
caught in the wild, are not only capable of damaging giant organization or 
causing financial damage to banks, they have the capability of bringing down 
the entire infrastructure of World Wide Web that could possibly trigger a 
catastrophic event [7] . The most disturbing aspect of this scenario is, that 
these malware target the existing vulnerabilities in individual computers 
without even triggering an alert in the security software installed [8]. Not only 
the individual computers, computers part of an enterprise network, or smart 
devices are attacked by such malware, the infected devices are frequently 
used to attack bigger targets [9], such as; internet service providers, 
government organizations and infrastructures, and email servers.   
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A little less than half a million malware are released every day, majority of them 
are variants of previously identified malware but still have the capabilities to 
execute a lethal attack [10]. This cyberwar and successful attacks reveal the 
multidimensional risks that are faced by every consumer of modern 
technology, causing a daunting damage of $1.7 billion only in the UK [11]. This 
number of financial damages caused by cyberattacks are expected to rise 
above $5.8 trillion by 2020 [12]. The damage a malware author can cause 
without even moving from their chair is not only staggering, it is also becoming 
an attractive form of business.  
If there is a successful malware attack on an enterprise network, despite their 
security infrastructure, it takes around six months on average to detect an 
infection, eradicating that infection can take another month [13], [14]. The 
amount of damage caused by a malware infection is directly proportional to 
the amount of time taken to identify and eliminate that infection [15]. One of 
the most relevant example is of Zeus malware, which was initially identified in 
2007 but couldn’t be stopped [16]. According to an estimation by some security 
companies, Zeus infected around 3.6 million PCs only in U.S. and millions 
more around the world [17].  
This scenario raises a serious question on the presence of antiviruses and 
other security software along with the amount of resources they require to 
operate in an individual system or in a network. The current ecosystem of 
technology with an enormous amount of data generation capabilities not only 
requires a higher level of security mechanisms, it also require that mechanism 
to be extremely energy efficient giving it the ability to protect growing number 
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of heterogeneous devices. This study focusses on the limitations of current 
techniques and presents a framework, which consumes less resources and 
provides a higher level of malware detection.  
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to identify the current requirements of security against 
malware attack by investigating the anatomy of modern and sophisticated 
malware, which helps to evaluate the performance of current commercial 
antiviruses and identify their limitations against modern malware. This paves 
the way to design, develop, and evaluate a comprehensive and energy 
efficient malware detection framework targeting PE (Portable Executable) 
files, which amalgamates state-of-the-art malware detection techniques with 
the conventional techniques to enhance the detection of modern malware with 
obfuscation abilities. Following objectives had to be fulfilled to achieve this aim:  
a) Understand the occurrence of important anomalies in a malware by 
statically analyzing a large set of malicious PE files.  
b) Examine the malware analysis and detection techniques currently used 
commercially 
c) Analyze the machine learning techniques introduced in malware 
detection by different studies 
d) Design and implement an analysis module that can retrieve a 
comprehensive set of relevant feature anomalies from PE files with 
customized and decisive heuristics 
CHAPTER 1 
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e) Design, implement, and evaluate a module that incorporates the 
analysis module with conventional malware detection techniques to 
make accurate and reliable malware detection 
f) Identify efficient and appropriate machine learning algorithms that can 
be trained to recognize anomalies and accurately detect a malicious 
file 
g) Design a classification module that can learn from malware anomalies 
and differentiate between clean and malicious files with the help of 
machine learning algorithms 
h) Develop a framework that amalgamate analysis module and 
classification module to work as a coherent unit  
i) Evaluate the accuracy of the entire framework by testing it against a 
large set of clean and malicious files  
j) Evaluate the commonly used commercial antiviruses for their resource 
consumption 
k) Design and implement a hosting model for the malware detection 
framework that is energy efficient and does not rely on host systems’ 
CPU resources 
l) Deploy the framework on the hosting model and evaluate the energy 
efficiency and performance of the model along with the framework 
operations. 
1.3 Proposed Solution 
The results of current malware detection techniques and software are not quite 
effective [18] in terms of providing security to their consumers. There is a 
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diverse pool of techniques including the conventional malware detection 
techniques that can be used in a combination to enhance the malware 
detection rate on a commercial level for general users [19]. Unfortunately, 
majority of the novel techniques presented in the recent times are only limited 
to a certain aspect of detection or a specific type of files and do not provide an 
approach that targets the multidimensional problem. The problem faced by 
general and enterprise users is not just lack of ability to identify modern and 
previously unknown malware, it also involves the high resource consumption 
by the conventional detection software.  
The signature based malware detection can detect known malware and when 
combined with malware heuristics it can possibly detect new variants of 
previously known malware. However, the level of success of this combination 
is highly dependent on the patterns and rules that are used to formulate the 
heuristics of feature anomalies. Implementation of machine learning 
techniques has also proved to be quite successful in many studies, which is 
also applied on anomaly heuristics, its success is also dependent on patterns 
and heuristics used to apply algorithms.  
This research proposes the implementation of a combination of machine 
learning algorithms on a set of heuristics extracted from a large set of clean 
and malicious files. The proposed framework is based on a two-layer decision 
making process, which includes the first layer of decision making with the help 
of static heuristics analysis and the second layer of machine learning 
algorithms.  
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• An intelligent malware detection framework comprising of two-layered 
detection process was developed. The first layer is comprised of static 
heuristics analysis, which analyzes a file and decides about its 
legitimacy based on the anomalies detected in the feature heuristics. 
The decision made by this analysis is endorsed by external sources 
using the conventional detection techniques. In the second layer, 
machine learning algorithms; SVM (Support Vector Machine), Decision 
Tree, and Boosting on Decision Tree, were applied to make the 
detection process precise and highly reliable. The feature heuristics and 
anomalies extracted from sets of both clean and malicious files are 
used to train the machine learning algorithms, which makes the final 
decision about a file highly accurate. In the design, implementation, and 
evaluation of this part of the research, we trained and tested the 
machine learning algorithms against a large set of clean and malicious 
files.  
• As mentioned above, this research targets two major problems of 
conventional security mechanisms; detection rate and resource 
consumption. In the second part of this study; a cloud-based hosting 
model that strategically combines different components of AWS 
(Amazon Web Services) was designed, implemented, and evaluated as 
a customized hosting model for the malware detection framework. The 
main idea behind this hosting model is to make the framework 
extremely energy efficient and at the same time have the capability of 
scaling the framework for continuous learning. The hosting model 
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allows the framework to work with a dual-aspect. The first aspect of the 
framework trains the algorithms with the feature heuristics, whereas, 
the second aspect allows the framework to work in real-time scenarios. 
The operational requirements of both aspects of the framework were 
evaluated and the resource consumption was compared with the 
resource consumption of commercial antiviruses’ running in their scan 
mode. 
1.4 Contributions 
The key contribution of this research is the design and implementation of an 
intelligent and energy efficient framework for detection of Windows based 
modern malware. To achieve this, we had to divide the work in the following 
two directions: 
1. An intelligent malware detection framework, which initially examines 
the common and unique anomalies found in malware by statically 
analyzing a large set of malware. This helps to identify the use of such 
anomalies in identifying modern malware and the use of machine 
learning to make autonomous decision. This leads to the proposal of a 
framework, which incorporates conventional malware detection 
techniques with customized and comprehensive feature heuristics to 
train multiple machine learning algorithms. This study provides a 
detailed discussion on pivotal heuristics that differentiate a clean file 
from malicious file. This discussion is based on the analysis performed 
on large set of malicious files containing nearly one million files from 
different families of malware. The study presented in Chapter 3, implies 
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that how different important malware features can be combined to form 
patterns that will help machine learning algorithms to train for real-time 
detection. The role of conventional detection techniques in detecting 
known malware is also discussed leading to the integration of 
conventional detection techniques with the analysis module. Moreover, 
the benefits of machine learning algorithms and how they can be 
significant in lowering the false-positive rate and enhancing the 
accuracy if a good combination of heuristics is used to train them, are 
also discussed.  
2. A cloud-based energy efficient hosting model, initially evaluates the 
conventional antiviruses to identify their CPU resource consumption 
while operating in scan mode. This helps to identify one of the main 
weaknesses of commercial antiviruses, which is then targeted to 
propose a hosting model. The hosting model for the framework 
discussed in Chapter 3, which has a client server architecture, 
strategically combines different components of AWS to design a 
bespoke hosting model for the intelligent malware detection framework. 
Each component of the hosting model is specifically designed to host 
each module of malware detection framework with energy efficiency, 
quick response, and scalability as primary goals. The study presented 
in Chapter 4, initially discusses the CPU resource consumption problem 
of commercial antiviruses and implications of their operations on the 
host machine. The specific requirements of individual modules in the 
malware detection framework are then focused, leading to the proposal 
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of a high-level architecture of the cloud-based hosting model. 
Subsequently, the selected components of AWS are discussed, with 
respect to the operational requirements of the individual modules. 
Moreover, the implementation of the hosting model, deployment of the 
framework, and finally the evaluation of both; framework and hosting 
model is presented. The client and server modules of the hosting model 
are separately monitored to evaluate their performance and compare it 
with the commercial antiviruses. 
1.5 Research Scope 
This work solely targets the features and heuristics of PE (Portable 
Executables), commonly known as .exe files. The discussions and 
contributions revolve around the analysis performed on PE files, use of 
proposed approach on other file types or in other environments is out of scope.  
The proposed framework is specifically based on the features and heuristics 
generated through static analysis of PE files in conjunction with signature-
based detection and machine learning algorithms. Dynamic analysis of files is 
out of scope.  
Different datasets of clean and malicious files with known malware were used 
in this research, as discussed in Chapter 3. Different datasets might produce 
slight dissimilar results but they should produce similar level of accuracy and 
energy efficiency. 
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1.6 Thesis Structure 
The remaining parts of the thesis are structured as follows:  
• Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter presents background of the research followed by a 
thorough discussion on the evolution of malware and the techniques 
used by modern malware to avoid getting detected. The discussion on 
different analysis techniques that can be used to analyse files along 
with their implications is then presented. Subsequently, relevant recent 
studies with their benefits and drawbacks are discussed, which lays the 
foundation for the presented research.  
 
• Chapter 3:  An Intelligent Malware Detection Framework 
This chapter presents the design, modelling, and implementation 
details of the intelligent malware detection framework. It starts by 
discussing the background of the proposed framework and why this 
specific approach of detecting malware was taken. The study finally 
presents the evaluation of the entire framework followed by the 
discussion on outcomes. 
 
• Chapter 4: An Energy Efficient Hosting Model for the Malware Detection
  Framework 
Chapter 4 presents a cloud-based energy efficient hosting model for the 
malware detection framework proposed and discussed in Chapter 3. 
The chapter discusses each module and its hosting requirements 
CHAPTER 1 
11 
 
separately and how they are managed by the hosting model. It then 
evaluates both; framework and the hosting model, while running in real-
time  
 
• Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Work 
The conclusion presents the discussion on identified problems solved 
by the proposed framework and the hosting model by highlighting the 
benefits of the proposed solutions. It then discusses the limitations of 
the solution and how they can be eliminated. Finally, it presents the 
future enhancements of the entire proposed framework and how it can 
be used for a broader domain.  
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CHAPTER 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The ever-evolving landscape of cyber-attacks requires to be tackled by an ever-
evolving ecosystem of security tools, techniques, and mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, unlike the advancements seen in the malware proliferation in the 
recent past, the security mechanisms are still based on the conventional 
detection techniques used since many years [20]. Recently identified malware 
have used several different types of techniques for infection and propagation and 
their analysis show the innovative techniques they have used to bypass the 
security mechanisms of networks and individual computers [21]. However, such 
innovations are not employed by conventional antiviruses and other security 
mechanisms. Various new and unconventional approaches have been proposed 
in the recent past to stop a malware to infect and propagate but the question of 
their effectiveness persists and how general users can benefit from new 
techniques matters the most. 
One of the better approach would be design techniques based on the modus 
operandi of malware. Different analysis techniques with thorough approaches 
provide deep understanding of malicious pieces of codes [22] but such tools and 
techniques require time and computational resources, which is also one of the 
significant drawbacks of antiviruses. In this chapter, recently proposed analysis 
and detection techniques along with the conventional malware detection 
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techniques are discussed. Techniques including static feature extraction to 
support malware detection process are specifically focused in this chapter. 
2.2 Background 
One piece of software that is legitimate in one computer might be considered 
illegitimate in another computer or network. This logic vaguely identifies what a 
malware is along with its literal meaning; malicious software. Malware target 
vulnerability in a computer or in a network and exploit it to infect the targeted 
machine. This is done to use the computer or the entire network for several 
malicious reasons and usually it takes months, in some cases, years to identify 
that the network is infected. The taxonomy in which the malware are divided is 
based on the techniques they employ to infect their target. The following table 
presents the differences between types of malware present in the wild.  
Type Description 
Virus Viruses are passive in nature, they bind themselves to an existing 
program and propagate by duplicating themselves but requires to 
be copied to spread. They target benign executable files and 
corrupt them by attaching themselves [23]  
Trojan 
Horse 
Trojans act as a legitimate program and trick users to run it. Once 
executed, trojans can create backdoors in the system for different 
malicious reasons [24] 
Worms A computer worm is a standalone and active piece of code, which 
does not need a host program. It has the capability to replicate itself 
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across the network automatically by targeting vulnerabilities [25]. It 
continuously scans through the network for further propagation and 
consumes a lot of resources while doing so [26] 
Spyware Spyware do not necessarily harm the computer or network but they 
hide and monitor activities of individual users or the entire network [27]. They can be part of Trojans or worms and send the stolen 
information to their server [28] 
Bots It is derived from the word robot, with malicious intentions of forming 
a bot network otherwise known as botnet. Botnet is a large network 
of geographically dispersed computers working as bots or zombies, 
controlled by a C&C (command and control) server also known as 
botmaster [29]. Forming a botnet is just the foundation, which can 
be used for DDOS and other large scale attacks [30] 
Rootkit  The rootkit is not a simple malware with replication capabilities, it is 
a quite sophisticated software with multiple tools packed inside [31]. 
Once they have infected a computer or network, their embedded 
tools play a vital role to not only hide its processes in legitimate 
processes. It can escalate privileges of its processes without 
alarming the security software [32] 
Adware These are advertising support software designed to autonomously 
deliver advertisements in the form of popups or within a webpage [33]. A majority modern adware are used for revenue generation 
and don’t require popping up because they work as a background 
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process [34]. Adware authors also use them to transport spyware, 
which can spy on browser behavior and online transactions [35] 
Ransom
ware 
In the past few years, this specific category of malware have caused 
a lot of damage to many businesses, government services, and 
individuals [36]. Once infected, the system or an entire network 
along with its data can be locked and it will demand a ransom to 
unlock the files [37]. Ransomware encrypt the files in a unique way, 
which are not possible to decrypt using usually available techniques [38]. It follows the replication techniques used by a worm to 
proliferate its copies [39].  
 
2.3 Malware Evolution 
Since the first malicious piece of code was written, malware anatomy has evolved 
significantly. This anatomy of malware is continuously evolving to avoid the latest 
eradication techniques used by security organizations [20] [40] [41]. 
Unfortunately, the mainstream security mechanisms generally used do not match 
the advanced evasion and infection techniques used by the modern and lethal 
malware [42]. Every successful malware infection proves that the malware 
authors and their techniques are at least one step ahead of the eradication 
techniques used by their victims.  
The sophisticated detection evasion techniques used by malware signifies that 
the amount of time a malware stays undetected is directly proportional to the 
destruction it causes to the infected machine or network [41]. The anatomy of 
CHAPTER 2 
16 
 
latest malware reveals amalgamation of several evasion techniques, such as; 
polymorphism, oligomorphism, and metamorphism [43]. The implementation of 
such techniques benefits the malware authors in two different ways; it makes it 
virtually impossible for a conventional antivirus to detect it, malware use these 
techniques to generate their mutated copies for further propagation. Camouflage 
and mutational techniques have two basic objectives; armoring and proliferating 
the malware, these techniques are used by the malware authors for the past three 
decades with continuous and rapid enhancements that can be perceived in the 
analysis of recently discovered malware [44]. Such enhancements and lack of 
timely detection and prevention of modern malware depict the scarcity in the 
conventional defense techniques [45]. 
2.3.1 Malware Obfuscation 
The conventional malware detection techniques identify a malicious piece of 
executable mainly by matching its signature and heuristics with a set of stored 
malicious signatures and heuristics. If a malicious piece of code is modified even 
without changing the primary behavior, apparently it becomes a new malware. 
The process of malware obfuscation doesn’t change the functionality of the 
malware at all, it only changes the signature of that file. This type of change 
makes the file a completely new entity for antiviruses [46].  
There are many techniques that are collectively or individually used by the 
malware authors to obfuscate their malicious pieces of code. The commonly used 
techniques are discussed in the following sections. 
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2.3.1.1 Encrypted Malware 
Encrypting a file is the basic approach to change its physical appearance. 
Encryption is also one of the pioneering techniques used to evade the detection 
by avoiding signature matching and other similar techniques. An encrypted 
malware is comprised of two parts; the encrypted malware and its decryptor. The 
encrypted malware contains the main body of the malware and the decryptor is 
assigned the task of decrypting the main body once the infected programs 
executes. Usually, encrypted malware use simple XOR and the decryption is 
performed with the encrypted code’s XOR [47]. Although, the simple encryption 
was quite effective for evasion in the early days of obfuscated malware because 
antiviruses only relied on pattern matching. Modern day malware authors 
implement much complicated patterns for this process, which makes the 
decryption for malware analysts nearly impossible. Techniques such as; 
multilayer encryption, customized key generation, embedded message 
encryption is quite significantly used in modern malware [40]. 
2.3.1.2 Oligomorphic Malware 
The initial versions of encrypted malware were hard to detect but with 
advancements in the security mechanisms the basic approach used by encrypted 
malware was outdated. The oligomorphic malware were a newer generation of 
encrypted malware, which used mutated decryptors to encrypt and decrypt the 
main body of the malware [41]. A malware named Whale used one of the famous 
implementation of this technique, it carried many decryptors while propagating in 
a network and using a random decryptor for each instance of encryption and 
decryption. Other implementations of such techniques were more lethal and 
CHAPTER 2 
18 
 
employed techniques with dynamic generation of decryptors, which avoided the 
need of carrying a large amount of decryptors while propagating making the 
whole concept more efficient [48]. 
2.3.1.3 Polymorphic Malware 
The weaknesses of slight consistency in the oligomorphic malware gave birth to 
the new generation of malware known as polymorphic malware. Polymorphic 
malware use different type of encryption each time while replicating itself across 
the infected machine or network. They use mutation engine while replicating their 
instances, which allows the code to be transformed without the logic being 
changed [48]. While propagating in a network, polymorphic malware replicate 
itself in an encrypted form with a key different than the previous one and the 
decryption technique is embedded in the body. The polymorphic malware can 
evade the detection to a certain extent using such techniques because only a 
certain amount of decryptors can be generated with this technique [49].  
2.3.1.4 Metamorphic Malware 
The use of polymorphism in malware allows them to encrypt/decrypt using 
different techniques but metamorphic malware do not decryption to unpack itself 
in a constant body. Avoiding signature based detection of metamorphic malware 
is much more convenient as compare to the previously discussed types of 
malware, as they can evolve their code dynamically while moving from one 
generation to another [49]. They also can embed their code into one or multiple 
host programs making the malware nearly impossible to detect. Metamorphic 
malware use a combination of different obfuscation techniques to evolve into a 
newer generation, which is considerably dissimilar from its predecessor but 
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possess the same behavior. Following are the techniques that are used by the 
metamorphic malware [50]. 
A. Dead-Code Inclusion 
 
Figure 2.1: Sample Code for Obfuscation 
One of the simplest yet effective technique is including obfuscated or dead-code 
in the main body of the malware to evolve from one generation to another. The 
primary objective of this techniques is to make the evolved version of the code 
significantly different from the original code, which makes it extremely difficult to 
retrieve any operational hexadecimal search string [51]. These iterations in the 
code are identified as obfuscated because they do not change the behavior of 
the malware. The examples in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 present the original and 
the obfuscated code respectively. Figure 2.2 presents the obfuscated version of 
the code, which uses the NOP command but the command doesn’t make any 
difference to the code. This technique does obfuscate the code but it can be 
easily rectified by an antivirus only by eliminating the dead commands before 
performing the analysis.  
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Figure 2.2: Dead-Code Inclusion (Original Code in Figure 2.1) 
To make dead-code inclusion more resilient against detection Figure 2.3 present 
an example, which obfuscates the code with impractical commands that are not 
exactly dead and do flow control for the compiler but doesn’t necessarily make 
any difference to the functionality. This technique is hard to eliminate by 
conventional detection mechanisms because there are some practical 
differences in the both samples of the code.  
 
Figure 2.3: Inserting Impractical Commands 
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B. Registers Swapping 
Another technique used by metamorphic malware is registers swapping, which 
was initially used by RegSwap malware in 1998. Malware using this technique 
will evolve from one generation by using the same code but by switching CPU 
registers [52]. This technique was initially useful for the malware authors but 
there was a weakness. In a conventional signature scan wildcard strings can be 
used to identify malware of newer generations with the signature of its 
predecessors. 
C. Subroutine Permutation 
Original code of a malware can be obfuscated with the help of this technique. By 
using subroutine permutation, a malware with n number of subroutines can 
generate n! number of unique variations of itself [53]. This technique was used 
by a malware Ghost, which had 10 subroutines and it had the ability to generate 
3628800 unique variants of the original version but due to the persistent main 
content of individual subroutine it can be detected by using search strings. 
D. Replacing Instructions 
This technique uses equivalent instructions to substitute original instruction or a 
group of instruction. Instructions like XOR EAX, EA are equivalent to SUB EAX 
EA, if replaced, there will not be any change in the functionality of the code but 
they can generate a dissimilar hexadecimal instruction representation (opcode) [52]. Further details of this technique can be found in [54]. Figure 2.4 presents 
the sample code of Figure 2.1 with the application of substituting instructions.  
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Figure 2.4: Substituting Instructions 
E. Adding Jump Instructions 
Another technique introduced to help the malicious code evolve dynamically from 
one generation to another was adding jump instructions in the code. The famous 
Windows 95 malware known as Zperm adopted this technique quite effectively. 
It dynamically adds and removes jump instructions in the main body, all these 
added instructions will point to a new instruction that will point to a new instruction [54]. This allows the malware to avoid generating a constant main body, which 
makes it extremely difficult for an antivirus to detect it. Figure 2.5 illustrates an 
example of how Zperm added jump instructions in its code. In each iteration of 
this malware, a new main body is generated that has no functionality difference 
but the control flow in the code is completely different. 
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Figure 2.5: Sample Code of Zperm using Jump Instructions 
F. Mutating Host Code 
Mutating the host software code is another lethal technique used by metamorphic 
malware. This technique was pioneered by a malware known as Win95/Bistro 
that evolved rapidly into newer generations after infecting the host but while 
evolving and mutating its own code dynamically, it also evolved the host software 
by mutating its main body in every iteration [55]. This make things more 
complicated for security software to identify, random transformation of code was 
used by the mutation engine to generate new variants for this malware. 
Recovering the host software from this infection is nearly impossible as the 
malware not only mutates the main body of the host, it also obfuscates host’s 
entry point, which doesn’t allow the disinfection process to be completed [56]. 
Figure 2.6 presents a simple illustration of mutation and replication of a single 
malware sample.  
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Figure 2.6: Mutation and Replication of a Single Malicious Sample 
G. Code Integration 
Infection of a malware using host code mutation is hard to detect but impossible 
to disinfect. Whereas, a more sophisticated and nearly impossible to detect 
techniques is code integration, which was pioneered by Win95/Zmist. The 
mutation engine of this malware has the ability to dissect an executable file into 
individual sections, it then substitutes itself with small code blocks in each section 
of the dissected executable and then rebuilds it [46]. This technique, if used 
properly, can allow a malware to flawlessly integrate its malicious code in the 
individual sections of the host executable, which is not only exceptionally hard to 
disinfect, it is impossible to even detect such infection by only using conventional 
detection techniques [56].  
Apart from the obfuscation techniques used by modern malware to avoid 
detection, malware use some additional techniques to evade the efforts to 
understand their structure, characteristics and behaviour with the help of different 
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types of analysis. Anti-debugging is one of the techniques used by malware to 
avoid getting analysed. Figure 2.7 presents the anti-debugging APIs retrieved 
after statically analysing a malicious file. The advance analysis techniques 
discussed in the later section employ debugging tools to go through instructions 
contained in a file to operate in a system. The anti-debugging technique is 
implemented by using code checksums in runtime, decryption key generation 
with help of interrupts, monitoring API routines in debugging, monitoring registry 
keys. Many legitimate programs also use anti-debugging techniques in their code 
to avoid piracy but a legitimate and illegitimate file using anti-debugging 
techniques can be differentiated by comparing their implementations [57]. The 
anti-debugging APIs used mostly by malware are listed below.  
 
Figure 2.7: Anti-Debug APIs 
Another most commonly used techniques by modern malware to avoid getting 
analysed is anti-virtual machine. Behavioural analysis techniques used against 
malware execute the malicious file in a virtualized environment to understand its 
objectives [58]. Anti-virtual machine technique is used by malware to avoid 
getting their objectives that could reveal their identity and variants identified. 
These techniques get activated as soon as malware identifies that it’s been 
executed in a virtual environment, which stops the file to be completely unpacked. 
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2.4 Analysis of Malware 
In the previous section, we discussed the evolution of malware over the period of 
decades and how many malware pioneered different obfuscation techniques to 
evade the detection mechanisms. In this section, we discuss different techniques 
that are used to understand the behaviours, characteristics, and objectives of a 
malware.  
While analysing a malware it is pivotal to understand that one malware has a 
family of variants that could be in millions and it is practically impossible to capture 
and analyse each variant. The positive thing in this scenario is that the entire 
family of variants of one malware might have the same behaviour but the 
alarming thing is that each variant could have a separate objective while 
operating in an infected network or individual computer. Another thing that should 
be considered is that one malware can have various behaviours. Literature [59] 
claims that a single malware executing a set of malicious commands over the 
weekend can be replaced by a set of completely different commands that it 
executes on Mondays. This behaviour is usually observed in malware variants 
that specifically target enterprise networks and mainly perform their malicious 
activities during the weekend when continuous network monitoring is not 
possible. A similar approach is used by a malware, which goes in hibernation 
mode during the office hours and activates during night time to perform all the 
malicious tasks.  
There are mainly two different types of analysis that can be performed on a 
malware; one to understand the behaviour and the other one for identifying the 
characteristics, they are known as dynamic and static analysis respectively. Both 
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types have their own benefits and play a significant role in comprehensively 
understanding a malware to detect it and prevent it from infecting and 
propagating. 
2.4.1 Static Analysis 
Statically analysing a malware is the most common technique that is used to 
understand its characteristics. Static analysis not only retrieves the basic 
characteristics of a file, it can give a comprehensive report that contains quite 
decisive information. As the name suggests, static analysis doesn’t require the 
file to be executed and it only gathers the static information about the file [60]. 
There are several online and offline tools available that can be used to perform 
static analysis, many highly effective open-source tools can also be used for 
static analysis. Tools such as; VirusTotal [61], PEFrame [62], PEiD [63], 
PEStudio [64], Mastiff [65], and Pyew [66] straightforwardly generate analysis 
reports that can help to understand many simple yet decisive characteristics 
about a file. Many of these tools have graphical user interface that allows new 
analysts to grasp the idea of feature extraction. These malware analysis tools 
provide fully automated analysis with a limited requirement of setting up a simple 
laboratory, without the need of a high-performance computer. VirusTotal 
eliminates the need of setting up even a simple laboratory by providing a web 
platform for static analysis. This Google powered web platform uses a 
comprehensive engine comprised of fifty-nine antiviruses and provides thorough 
reports starting from basic string analysis to fully automated analysis. It also 
provides an API that can be integrated with any supporting tool or even through 
a command line. Static analysis is simple to perform and can provide a detailed 
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report of the static features of a malicious or clean file without the need of an 
isolated analysis environment, however, the behaviour of a file cannot be 
understood by a static analysis.  
A much advance level of static analysis is performed in the form of reverse 
engineering, which uses disassembler to examine an executable’s complete 
cycle of execution along with the embedded commands to understand the core 
objectives of the malware [67]. It is essential to know about the targeted operating 
system beforehand along with the system architecture, instruction sets, and 
assembly language. Reverse engineering is usually performed with the help of 
specialized tools, such as; OllyDbg [68], IDA [69], GDB [70], Immunity Debugger [71], and WinDbg. These programs can generate CFG (Control Flow Graph) that 
identifies the potential flow of the analysed executable. This not only helps to 
identify the possible behaviour of the executable, it can quite effectively identify 
the variants from one family of malware [55].  
One of the obfuscation techniques known as instruction replacement, as 
discussed above, can cause obscurity in a CFG if it is implemented in the 
analysed executable. Additionally, malware that can dynamically change their 
code as they propagate within a single computer cannot produce a consistent 
CFG, which makes their overall behaviour hard to document. 
2.4.2 Dynamic Analysis 
Dynamic analysis is a much-detailed type of analysis and requires the file to be 
executed. It not only retrieves the physical characteristics, it can also identify the 
behaviour of a file. Unlike static analysis, dynamic analysis requires a sandbox, 
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which is a controlled environment and doesn’t allow the malware to effect its 
surrounding with its infection while it’s running [72]. Executing the malware in a 
sandbox allows the analyst to understand how a malware infects, how it 
propagates the infection, how it operates within a network or individual computer, 
and what its objectives are. This gives a detailed information about a malicious 
file and how it can be stopped.  
Like static analysis, dynamic analysis also starts from a basic analysis and can 
go up to a quite comprehensive level. The basic level of dynamic analysis has 
the objective of identifying malware operations within a system [73]. This is 
performed in a virtualized environment, which replicates the original system and 
the original state of that environment is preserved. The malware is executed in 
that environment and once it is executed, the original state of the machine is 
compared with the new state to identify the changes made by the malware. This 
process doesn’t give a detailed information about the malware as compared to 
the advanced dynamic analysis techniques but it is quite helpful to eradicate the 
infection of a malware from a system by identifying the changes it has made to a 
clean system [74]. This not only help to remove malware infections, it also doesn’t 
require the resources usually required by a detailed analysis. This level of 
dynamic analysis is important like basic static analysis to gain the basic 
understanding of a malware, which allows to stop a malware and its further 
propagation.  
Unlike the basic level of dynamic malware analysis, the advance level of dynamic 
analysis comprises of tools based on multiple techniques. In this level of analysis, 
each state of a malware while it’s running in a controlled environment is 
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monitored closely, which includes the state of malware’s code. The advance 
analysis is quite extensive, which is another reason that it runs in a controlled 
environment that allows the analysts to monitor each and every aspect of its 
functionalities and their implications on the system [75]. The detailed reports of 
such analysis contains the aspects of external API calls, function calls, internal 
and external network traffic, creation of new directories, alteration of existing 
directories, unauthorised ports access, changes in registry, dropped files, and 
state changes during the operational period [73]. This allows to understand the 
primary objectives of a malware based on its interaction with the system files, and 
entities within a network and outside the network. As discussed earlier, a single 
malware typically has a huge family of variants and analysing the entire family of 
variants that quite easily be in millions is practically impossible. This type of 
analysis gives a detailed understanding of malware behaviour, which not only 
allows to identify variants from the same family it also assists in formulating a 
solution to bring down the entire family of variants. Automated tools running as a 
web-service like Malwr [76] are quite useful and convenient for new and 
experienced analysts, as they don’t require a sandboxed environment to be 
developed for dynamic analysis and they quite quickly provide detailed reports 
on many variants from a single malware family based on their behaviour [76]. 
2.5 Conventional Detection Techniques 
In the modern era of computing malware infection is inevitable and so is the 
presence of at least one security software on individual computers. The 
discussion in the previous sections imply that avoiding a malware infection or 
even detecting an infection and removing it is merely impossible and the 
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detection techniques usually used cannot reach the level of stealth maliciousness 
of modern malware [20]. However, the conventional detection techniques used 
by antiviruses and other security software do protect the host systems against 
malicious attacks to a certain extent. These techniques are effective against 
previously known malware or the malware whose signatures and other apparent 
features are available in the database of security software. Major security 
software giants, such as; BitDefender, Symantec, Kaspersky, McAfee, etc. have 
a wide range of security software for both businesses and individual users. These 
software claim to provide a shield against modern malware and disinfect any 
previous infection by returning the affected software to its previous and legitimate 
state [77]. The techniques, which are used by these software are from a limited 
pool of techniques that is shared by all the security service providers. Although, 
many of these security service providers have some unique proprietary 
techniques and different implementations of conventional techniques, which 
makes them different from each other and distinguish their results but that doesn’t 
raise the overall bar of malware detection rate.  
Following section discusses the techniques that are most effectively used by 
antiviruses and other security software for malware detection and prevention. 
2.5.1 Signature-Based Malware Detection 
Signature detection is one of the commonly used techniques in antiviruses and 
other similar security software. It relies on sequences of specific byte codes that 
are unique to every file whether it’s clean or malicious, these static footprints of 
malware samples are used to detect similar files in the host machine or network [78]. A small modification in the code can change the signature of the file, 
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however, it can still be detected based on the separate and accumulated 
signatures of individual sections of a file. The unique byte code sequences are 
used as a representation for each sample and stored in the database of 
antiviruses. If a file containing the similar signature is found in the host system 
and or network by an antivirus then it is classified as malicious [79]. Similar 
approach is used to identify clean files along with the authenticity of their 
publishers’ certificate. Signature detection requires a comprehensive set of up to 
date signature that are regularly updated considering the massive number of 
malware captured every day. This gives rise to another problem that regularly 
updating and storing a large number of signatures requires access to similar 
amount network resources and storage space on the host machine. If the 
antivirus’s signature database is not up-to-date with the latest signatures, which 
is usually the case, then it will not be able to detect majority of new threats faced 
by its users [77].  
Lack of up-to-date signatures is not the only problem with this approach, as 
discussed earlier, the detection evasion techniques used by modern malware can 
dodge this technique by changing its source-code dynamically. The obfuscation 
techniques used by malware with metamorphic behaviour that can change their 
code dynamically as they propagate don’t leave a static footprint as move laterally 
in a network or in a single machine. The signature of one of its sample is 
completely different from another sample and it can cause ambiguity for analysts 
and antiviruses. One of the approaches that can be taken is to target the mutation 
engine of such malware and detect them through their mutation engine [75]. 
However, many of these malware randomly choose their mutation engines from 
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a large pool of dynamically evolving engines, a mutation engine based detection 
can add on the existing problem of large resource consumption by these 
solutions. 
2.5.2 Heuristics-Based Malware Detection 
Heuristics detection is mainly used a supporting technique besides signature 
detection to make the detection process quick and accurate. The term heuristics-
based detection doesn’t accurately define the process because the main 
objective of this technique is to use defined algorithms to identify patterns of files 
that match the already identified patterns of malicious files [45]. Malware 
signatures are generated after a thorough static analysis, which also generate 
several patterns from each sample that are collectively called heuristics. These 
patterns are then incorporated with the signature database in antiviruses to 
support the process of detection. This type of detection doesn’t necessarily use 
the collective patterns from one malware sample to detect similar malware, it also 
breaks down the patterns for detection [80].  
Heuristics-based malware detection is based on static analysis, which makes it 
quite quick. It also can find variants from the same family based on pattern 
matching. As discussed above, the patterns generated after malware analysis, 
they are broken down and used to identify similar features present in a different 
file [81]. Unlike signature detection, heuristic detection is not static and 
predefined, it improvises based on the environment it is operating, which makes 
it hard for a malware to escape from it.  
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The techniques used by modern malware avoid signature detection by 
dynamically mutating themselves, which doesn’t leave any static footprint on the 
system. With the help of heuristics generation a generic signature can be 
produced, which can be used against many, if not all, variants of a single family [82]. Although, there is a possibility of having several false positive with the 
implementation of this technique.  
Based on the above discussion heuristic detection play a vital role in combination 
with signature detection to accurately detect malware but the reason why modern 
malware are still able to evade this combination is the limited amount of 
information that is used to generate the heuristics. A large majority of malicious 
files hook themselves with the legitimate files and if analysed the generated 
heuristics are a combination of patterns from clean and malicious files [80]. If 
such heuristics are used to detect malicious files, the malware that corrupt a small 
portion of legitimate files will be able to evade the detection. Consequently, if files 
are classified as malicious based on the small amount of alleged maliciousness 
then number of false-positive will significantly rise. Therefore, the combination of 
patterns used to generate heuristics need to be enhanced significantly to make 
more accurate decisions but this also means that more resources will be required 
to run such techniques. 
2.5.3 Behavioural-Based Malware Detection 
Behavioural detection is a technique that can successfully penetrate the detection 
evasion shield created by malware through obfuscation. It performs dynamic 
analysis of files to perceive their activities and behaviours in different operating 
environments, which are used to develop patterns to identify similar behavioural 
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patterns in other executables. As mentioned above, behavioural detection is 
based on dynamic analysis of executables that requires time and resources [59]. 
Although this technique can bypass the obfuscation techniques implemented by 
malware, it requires a detailed ruleset that explains the normal behaviours of 
executables in usual execution environments as compared to controlled or 
sandboxed environments. Without defining such parameters, it is significantly 
hard to identify a normal and an unsafe behaviour of an executable in a specific 
environment. 
2.6 Recent Research Advancements in Malware Detection 
In the previous sections, we have discussed different techniques used by modern 
malware to avoid getting detected by antiviruses and other security software, we 
also discussed analysis techniques that are used to understand the 
characteristics and behaviours of malicious executables. Additionally, we 
presented a discussion on different conventional detection techniques that are 
quite commonly used by security software to detect a malicious code, along with 
the foundations of these detection techniques. In this section, we are going to 
discuss different recent researches conducted that are relevant to our research 
along with their benefits and weaknesses. Our work focusses on different static 
analysis based heuristics extracted from a large sample of clean and malicious 
files to define rules to differentiate between both types. These heuristics are then 
used in conjunction with a combination of different machine learning algorithms. 
We specifically discuss recently conducted researches in the same area.  
Use of different types of features extracted through static analysis or other 
methodologies has been proposed in several different studies [44], [24], [3], [83], 
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[48], [49], [74]. Many studies have proposed customised rules based on different 
features and heuristics from clean and malicious files [82], [81], [45], [86], [87], [88]. Machine learning has also been applied on a small set of heuristics by some 
studies to differentiate between clean and malicious files.  
Using machine learning for the identification of malware has been proposed using 
several different techniques by many researchers [84], [85], [22], [89], [90], [52], 
[53]. Each of these studies have their own methodologies to approach the 
problem of malware identification, by increasing the true positive, and reducing 
the false positive rate. Majority of the research in malware detection is based on 
windows-based malware and only focus on the detection of one type of malicious 
code. However, more than 90% of the industrial environment is based on 
windows, therefore, the threat of windows-based malware is significantly higher. 
The conventional techniques of malware detection, also known as signature-
based detection used by antiviruses are still quite useful and it can flawlessly 
detect a known malware. These techniques are not very helpful when there is an 
attack from a new or unknown malware, which is why there is a huge gap in the 
industry, despite several studies in this area. 
One of the most relevant studies in this area were conducted by Kolter and Maloof 
(hereon KM) [93]. They drew techniques from machine learning and data mining 
and applied them on their collection. In their study, they used a common text 
classification practice, n-grams, which tested the results of various classifiers on 
malware detection. The techniques included in their research were; SVM, 
decision trees, Naïve Bayes, and then applying boosting on each of the 
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techniques [84] [93]. The KM approach used the AUC (Area under Curve) of an 
ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) to evaluate the performance of their 
classifier, which they tested based on the highest information gains n-grams 
They treated the presence or absence of the specified n-gram as Boolean on 
their classifier for boosted decision tree. As per their results, their model of 
boosted decision tree was able accomplish the finest accuracy rate out of all, 
achieving a 95% confidence interval AUC i.e. 0.9958 ± 0.0024. Boosting 
significantly enhances the performance of weak or unstable classifiers by 
decreasing their variance and bias but it can affect inversely on the stable 
classifiers, KM approach claims to improve the stable classifiers through boosting 
as well. The samples both benign and malicious used by them comprised of 1971 
benign files and 1651 malicious files. The benign executables were retrieved from 
Windows OS (XP, 2000), and other online resources. Whereas, the malicious 
collection was obtained from MITRE Corporation and VX Heavens online 
repository. The KM research also used their approach of static heuristics 
technique for identifying payload functionality of malware. It identifies the 
functionality without dynamically analysing malware, which is an efficient way 
because it doesn’t utilize resources required for sandboxing and eliminates the 
threats involved in dynamic analysis. They could identify payload functionality 
with the help of reverse engineering analysis reports of a subset of their complete 
collection. The KM approach showed promising results in two different directions; 
malware detection and payload identification. However, there are some 
weaknesses in this approach, considering the small sample size, missing 6 out 
of 291 malicious files is a real game changer in real life detection. This means if 
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the dataset is bigger, it can significantly increase the number of malicious files 
missed in a scan, which should be the main concern while detecting malware. 
Moreover, KM approach is not very effective for obfuscated malware and can 
easily omit such malicious files during the detection process. 
MaTR approach is another noteworthy contribution in this domain in which they 
recreated the experimental environment of KM using same dataset and the same 
formula presented in equation 1 to highlight their weaknesses. MaTR approach 
used 31193 malicious and 25195 clean files in the initial experiment and 
compared their results with KM approach, which showed improvements over KM 
with the following mean and confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2.8: ROC Curves for KM n-gram Retest and MaTR [80] 
The MaTR approach outperforms the KM approach and prove it by recreating the 
KM experiments, as presented in Figure 2.8 and Table 2.1. MaTR system design 
introduces an interesting approach by adding a human component in its system 
as illustrated in Figure 2.9. The reason behind introducing a human component 
is to give the system a capability of real-time detection [80]. This means that with 
the help of a human operator continuously monitoring the system logs, decisions 
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on legitimacy of the files can be made by looking at live anomalies occurring in 
the network. The human operator in this case provides appropriate responses for 
the type of malware rather than an automated and fixed response for all type of 
malware.  
Table 2.1: Mean AUC and Confidence Interval of KM and MaTR, c.f. [80]  
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: MaTR System Flow Diagram, c.f. [80] 
For the classification of malware, MaTR approach uses bagged decision tree 
classifiers, which can enhance the performance of simple decision tree and make 
the results more accurate. The MaTR approach heavily relies on the human 
operator to take decision based on the detection results, which can be its main 
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weakness. In the live environment, when a malware attacks a system or an 
enterprise network an automated response is necessary because when it comes 
to malware detection time is a key component. A malware can propagate and 
replicate itself within minutes inside a network or in a single machine, which 
means that an automated response is necessary [85]. In MaTR approach, the 
parameter of response time and its affects are not mentioned. Additionally, the 
classification methodology of MaTR claims a very high detection rate, however, 
the performance on obfuscated malware is not present and it lacks the ability to 
do so. 
There are several different studies that have used machine learning in malware 
detection by using different types of classifiers in their work. One of the studies 
have applied Decision Tree, Random Forest, Bagging, and Adaboost on the 
headers extracted from 32-bit PE files to differentiate between clean and 
malicious files. One of the main problem with this technique is that it compares 
the approach with antiviruses by highlighting its weaknesses but doesn’t cover 
all the identified weaknesses. Additionally, the proposed approach in this study 
does produce promising results but as initial hypothesis of this study focussed on 
real-life implications, there is clear limitation of 32-bit PE files, new malware 
samples, and resource consumption.  
Techniques such as [22], do have the ability to identify a vast range of previously 
unidentified malware by using a combination of static and dynamic malware 
analysis but one of the main limitations that are not covered in this approach is 
the amount of time needed to identify a malicious file in real-time, not to mention 
the amount of resources required for such a thorough and resource intensive 
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approach. This is a serious issue in malware detection, as the amount of time 
taken to detect an infection is directly proportional to the amount of damage 
caused by that infection.  
Another relevant study [94] uses opcode generation through malware analysis 
and implements quite efficient machine learning algorithms. The results of this 
study are quite promising as well but one of the main weakness of this approach 
is the limitation of type of malware it’s tested against. The collection of data used 
in this research is comprised of unpacked disabled malware and malware 
obfuscation is completely excluded, which raises the question about the benefits 
of this approach. Generating opcodes through statically analysing malware to 
train and test machine learning algorithms is an efficient approach but excluding 
a whole family of malware, which dominates the taxonomy of all malware families 
doesn’t justify the application of this study.  
As mentioned earlier, there are many studies that claim to effectively differentiate 
between clean and malicious files. Several of them use machine learning, fuzzy 
logic, and other techniques on statically or dynamically extracted features from 
both benign and malicious files. Nearly all of them target the vulnerabilities of 
conventional malware detection techniques that are commercially available. 
However, none of these studies present a solution that eliminates the generally 
highlighted weaknesses of conventional methodologies. One of the main 
weaknesses of antiviruses is the resource consumption of the host system while 
running in scan mode, which is an addition to the frequently discussed weakness, 
deficiency in detection rate. The studies claim to produce enhanced detection 
rate, quite often, lack the discussion about the real-time performance of their 
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approach, which includes the detection rate and more importantly the resources 
of host machine consumed while running in scan mode. 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, several aspects of malware infection, detection, and analysis 
relevant to our study have been discussed. Discussion starts with the evolution 
of malware and how the detection and infection techniques used by malware 
have enhanced in the past few decades. Numerous detection evasion techniques 
that have been used by malware over the years along with the combination of 
techniques that are currently used by modern malware to evade the detection 
process are also part of the discussion. Discussion also targets different analysis 
techniques that are used to analyse malware to extract their characteristics along 
with their behaviours and objectives, which led to the malware detection 
techniques that are generally used. Additionally, many conventional malware 
detection techniques generally used individually or in a combination by different 
antiviruses are discussed.  
Later in the discussion, some recent research studies relevant to our work, which 
used features and heuristics extracted from clean and malicious files through 
static or dynamic analysis and later applied several different machine learning 
algorithms to enhance malware detection rate. With the help of detailed analysis 
of recent studies, we could identify the weaknesses still present in this domain, 
which helped us to design and implement a comprehensive solution comprising 
of an intelligent malware detection framework and its hosting model targeting 
multiple dimensions of the identified problem.  
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CHAPTER 3. AN INTELLIGENT MALWARE DETECTION FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
A recent report claims that more than 7000 malware attacks are detected every 
hour and this number is for the attacks that are only targeting mobile devices [15]. 
This number is exponentially higher if the domain is broader, such as; personal 
computers, enterprise networks, web server, and other web enabled devices and 
infrastructure [10]. Out of millions of malware collected each year, majority of 
them are evolved versions of their predecessor [95], [96]. When a malware code 
is released in public, many of these malware are combined with a mutation 
engine, which allows other people with malicious intent to generate their version 
of that specific malware, such engines don’t require a lot of programming or 
technical knowledge for doing so [97]. Majority of modern malware are equipped 
with automated mutation engines, allowing them to recurrently change their 
appearance, location, and other apparent features dynamically [98]. Obfuscation 
and replication techniques are used to change the apparent features of malware 
dynamically to avoid getting detected by antiviruses and even if a single instance 
of a malware is detected, multiple, yet very different, instances of the same 
malware are generated making it nearly impossible for the security software or 
the security analyst to detect it [99], [100].  
Detecting a malware and preventing its infection or further propagation in a local 
network and in the wild requires an understanding of the infection and 
propagation techniques, which includes a comprehensive understanding of all 
the apparent features of malicious files along with how they behave in an 
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individual system or networked environment. The static and dynamic analysis of 
malware generate apparent and behavioral features of malicious files 
respectively, which allows the malware analysis and security experts to 
understand the dynamics of different types of vulnerabilities and the malware that 
exploit those vulnerabilities [91]. Both these analysis techniques are useful in 
different scenarios but if the main purpose is to accurately and rapidly detect a 
malware with minimum resource consumption, then static analysis is a better and 
reliable choice given that the tool used for analysis has a comprehensive and in-
depth approach [101].  
Analyzing a file statically doesn’t guarantee that it is going to be perfectly 
identified as malicious or safe. Moreover, for a system to identify whether the file 
is safe or malicious, it must first learn how to distinguish between the two types 
by understanding the difference between their apparent features [101].   
Integrating a combination of existing machine learning algorithms in the 
framework that will not only allow the framework to be rigorously trained to identify 
and differentiate between clean and malicious files, the comprehensive 
parameters used in the learning processes will help the framework to efficiently 
identify any unknown threats [92]. It is pivotal to use a rich set of features to train 
the algorithms, which could be produced with the help of a static analysis tool 
specifically customized to generate clean and comprehensive reports comprising 
of extremely relevant features [86].  
Large enterprise networks and even individual computers generate a large 
amount of network and process logs, which are analyzed by security analysts 
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and administrators to detect any malicious behavior. These logs and similar data 
if analyzed properly can protect the system against many, if not every, type of 
attacks. The main drawback in this scenario is the dependency on analysts, 
which makes the whole process extremely slow and less reliable. Many 
researchers and corporate sector entities are incorporating machine learning for 
malware detection and to predict any future attacks with very high true positive 
rate [102], [103], [104], [105]. Proposed framework incorporates an optimum 
combination of machine learning algorithms that can efficiently detect a malicious 
activity without consuming a lot of system resources. 
The approach taken in this research is a combination of conventional and novel 
techniques used for malware detection. This approach integrates the detection 
techniques generally used by antiviruses with state-of-the-art machine learning 
algorithms to develop a coherent framework that can be resilient and decisive 
against modern malware. The framework implements machine learning 
algorithms along with conventional detection techniques on a rich set of features 
extracted from clean and malicious files. To extract features from multiple files 
rapidly and accurately, an automated feature extraction tool was developed and 
later integrated with some open-source classes to make it more comprehensive. 
With the help of this static analysis based feature extraction tool a rich and diverse 
set of features were extracted from individual files from both classes; benign and 
malicious. The subsequent sections in this chapter present a thorough discussion 
of the overall framework comprising of classification methodology along with the 
analysis module that runs the feature extraction tool. 
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The proposed framework is more appealing as compared to many similar 
approaches for the following reasons: 
• Although, dynamic analysis can retrieve a huge number of behavioral 
characteristics from a malicious file but the implications of this type of 
analysis include higher resource consumption along with analyst’s 
involvement in the process. The comprehensiveness and automation in 
static analysis techniques can generate a set of features that can be used 
to identify a malware with much lesser resources. 
• Real-time environment requires a detection mechanism with preemptive 
behavior that can detect a malware without any supervision. A framework 
that can learn from the heuristics of clean and malicious files and can 
differentiate between the two, can identify a malicious file without an in-
depth analysis consuming time and other resources. 
• The unique combination of multiple machine learning algorithm along with 
a rigorous validation technique ensures an unbiased and accurate 
prediction of threats.   
• The comprehensive mechanism of classifying a file as malicious or safe, 
verifies the authenticity of the system along with the generation of detailed 
analysis reports, which are also used for real-time detection and 
prevention of known and unknown threats.  
• Not many systems with such features generate output which can further 
be used for the enhancement of other systems or research objectives. The 
analysis report generation in an appropriate and easy to understand 
manner could facilitate the sharing of threat intelligence data on a larger 
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scale, which can also enhance the overall ability of the proposed 
framework.  
In this chapter, we propose and evaluate an intelligent framework that can 
accurately detect both known and unknown malware threats. The framework is 
divided into two modules; first module uses an extensive tool which extracts the 
features from files that are later used to identify a clean or malicious file, second 
module use a unique combination of three different machine learning algorithms 
to identify a threat. The first module, which analyzes the files and generate a 
thorough report of their apparent features also can perform a basic classification 
that is useful in the long run, especially in the real-time detection. Whereas, the 
second module, which is defined as the classification module simultaneously 
apply machine learning algorithms; SVM, decision trees, and boosting on the 
extracted features to identify a malicious file. In the next section, we discuss the 
analysis results of around one million malicious files to understand the anomaly 
heuristics of such files. 
3.2 Understanding the Anomalies 
Before proposing and discussing the framework for detecting modern malware, 
it is essential to understand the anomalies that highlight the difference between 
the legitimate and malicious files. To develop a solution that accurately 
differentiates between the two file types, the fundamental step is to make the 
system learn about the features that make a file benign or malicious. As 
discussed previously, there are millions of malware captured every year and even 
though majority of them are just evolved versions of old and previously identified 
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malware, they do have some unique characteristics that allow them to stealthily 
penetrate a system or a network. Thoroughly analyzing a file statically can 
produce a rich set of characteristics for both benign and malicious file types and 
if both set of characteristics are compared, anomalies in the malicious set 
become evident given that, relevant and significant characteristics are compared. 
In this section, we discuss the features extracted through a thorough static 
analysis and their significance in the process of threat identification.  
To understand and identify the characteristics of malicious files, we gathered 
many malware samples from various sources and analyzed them with PEframe, 
which is an open-source static analysis tool. We analyzed nearly one million PE 
files and generated a comprehensive set of quantifiable data. The details of test 
bench for this analysis are presented in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1: Static Analysis Test Bench Details 
Tool/Machine Details 
Host Machine Intel Core i7 4790 CPU @ 3.60 
GHz  
RAM 16 GB, Hard Disk – 2 TB  
Operating System Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, 64 bit 
Static Analysis Tool PEframe with Python Scripts 
Number of Samples 917705 
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The analysis performed on around 917705 malware samples produced a 
comprehensive set of data, which is pivotal for the methodology design. The main 
idea behind analyzing many malware samples is to retrieve features along with 
the conventional signatures, which can be used to differentiate between a benign 
and malicious file. The data produced after the analysis comprised of a good 
number of heuristics with some known and unknown anomalies. One of the major 
characteristic seen in nearly every modern malware and its variant is that they 
are packed and even if the basic behavioral characteristics are same, their 
appearance might be different because of different packers used for packing. 
With the help of this analysis, we retrieved the top 20 packers used by malware. 
Figure 3.1 presents the most popular packers used by modern malware, which is 
a very important attribute to consider. However, the most popular packers 
amongst malware are legitimate and belong to either Microsoft or other popular 
software providers that cannot be flagged as malicious just by identifying the 
name but majorly malware tend to use older versions of legitimate packers. This 
technique is specifically used to exploit a legitimate software, which is not 
supported by its publishing organization anymore, such software are not usually 
considered a threat by the antiviruses. Malware authors also use multiple packers 
to pack one malware to deceive antiviruses with legitimate packer on top of a 
packer originally used to pack the malware.  
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Figure 3.1: Statistics of Packers used by Malware 
Many malware authors use techniques to avoid analysts understand their 
intentions by performing any type of analysis or reverse engineering on their 
packed code, which are known as anti-debug technique carried out with the help 
of APIs. Such techniques are also identified in the analysis, even though many 
analysis tools are not able to go past this point but they can retrieve if there is 
such technique used in an analyzed sample. The anti-debug technique is also 
used by many legitimate software publishers to avoid any attempt of piracy 
making it difficult to identify legitimate anti-debug and illegitimate anti-debug. 
However, a thorough static analysis can return the legitimacy of the APIs that are 
used by the analyzed file to implement anti-debug. Table 3.2 present the APIs 
and suspicious APIs retrieved from the malicious files, which denotes that a 
majority of these APIs are suspicious. This means that considering inclusion of 
APIs in the feature set can be quite useful.  
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Table 3.2: Anti-debug and Suspicious APIs 
API Name Number of 
Malware 
Suspicious APIs 
GetProcAddress 86000 GetProcAddress 
Sleep 78000 Sleep 
ExitProcess 76000 ExitProcess 
CloseHandle 74500 CloseHandle 
GetLastError 72301 GetLastError 
WriteFile 69845 WriteFile 
GetCurrentProcess 67458 GetCurrentProcess 
GetModuleFileNameA 65472 GetModuleFileNameA 
MultiByteToWideChar 63248 MultiByteToWideChar 
GetCommandLineA 62147 GetCommandLineA 
GetCurrentThreadid 61984 GetCurrentThreadid 
WideCharToMultiByte 61547 WideCharToMultiByte 
SetLastError 61471 SetLastError 
FreeLibrary 61243 FreeLibrary 
LoadLibraryA 61178 LoadLibraryA 
GetCurrentProcessid 60521 GetCurrentProcessid 
GetModuleHandleA 60341 GetModuleHandleA 
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UnhandledExceptionF
ilter 
60314 UnhandledExceptionF
ilter 
TlsGetValue 60158 TlsGetValue 
ReadFile 60014 ReadFile 
 
The tool used for analysis has a database of suspicious API signatures, which 
allows it to identify any API that falls under the category of being suspicious. All 
the files analyzed in this experiment were malicious, therefore, the analysis tool 
identified all the anti-debug APIs as suspicious. Even though legitimate files also 
use anti-debug feature but their APIs are not identified as suspicious and this 
specific feature can help identify a file as malicious.  
Nearly all malware camouflage themselves to penetrate a network by using 
names that seem legitimate and important to the user. The analysis showed that 
many names used by modern malware to camouflage themselves recur quite 
frequently as presented in the Figure 3.2. These recurring names are quite 
relevant when trying to match and understand anomalies in a system or a 
network.  
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Figure 3.2: Commonly used Malware Names 
Although, solely depending on these filenames is not a wise approach but it is 
important to flag an executable with a name such as; dll.exe, books.exe, 
music.exe, test.exe, etc. that are evidently suspicious. Another important aspect 
is the multiple sections in a malicious file and their names, as shown in Figure 
3.3, these names denote the type of functionality each section holds that can be 
used to vaguely understand the motives of a malware.  
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Figure 3.3: Mostly used Section Names in Malware 
Malware these days are persistent in nature with long-term motives, after 
infecting a network their focus is to maintain the access by trying to connect to a 
command and control center, expand infection by importing more malicious data, 
exporting important data. Consequently, scrutinizing any IP address, URL, or 
email address retrieved from analysis can play a significant part in identifying a 
malicious file and can also be used to match with the similar data retrieved from 
newly analyzed files. Table 3.3 presents the top email addresses retrieved by 
performing the analysis.  
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Table 3.3: Top Email Addresses Retrieved during Analysis 
Email Addresses 
admin@mictosoft.com 
info@microsott.com 
support@gnail.com 
claimnow@nationailottery.co.uk 
admin@getwebcake.com 
server@mitcsoftware.com 
admin@rjlsoftware.com 
accountrecovery@yontoo.com 
sales@applee.com 
iphone@aaple.com 
account@yaah00.com 
jdeb@autoscript.com 
pop@harzing.com 
sales@totusoft.com 
sandy-cyf@163.com 
sales@annazon.co.uk 
returns@amazone.com 
voucher@amazom.com 
claim@iebay.com 
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The anomalies extracted through static analysis from a large set of malware are 
not significant when considered individually, however, if used collectively within 
a framework, the accurate classification decisions can pivot on such anomalies.  
3.3 Building Blocks Overview 
In the previous section, we discussed the features extracted after a thorough 
static analysis performed on a large set of malicious files. The discussion 
presented in the previous section shows the significance of each features or 
anomaly detected by the static analysis tool and how it can be used to 
differentiate between a malicious and a clean file. In this section, we present an 
overview of the building blocks used in the design and development of the 
framework proposed in this chapter. The framework proposed later in this chapter 
is based on two main modules; a) the analysis module and b) the classification 
module. Both these modules have their own significance, which is based on the 
uniqueness of the building blocks integrated to develop a comprehensive 
framework for malware detection. 
3.3.1 Analysis and Features 
The approach proposed later in this study primarily relies on the features 
extracted through static analysis. To extract the most relevant and pivotal 
features from the comprehensive set of benign and malicious files, a python-
based automated analysis tool was developed that thoroughly analyzed the files 
statically and retrieve a rich set of decisive features, which are stored in separate 
files in a JSON format. These features are human readable and they are used 
for training, testing, and detection purposes by the classification module. To make 
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the static analysis and feature extraction tool more powerful and precise, some 
of the classes from an existing open-source tool PEFrame were integrated with 
the tool. After integration with open-source classes, the automated tool could 
work as an independent module in the overall framework. This feature extraction 
tool also integrates the private API of VirusTotal to endorse some of its many 
extracted results from a trusted third-party. Figure 3.4 [106] presents the features 
(without data) that are extracted after the analysis is performed on a single file.  
 
Figure 3.4: Sample JSON File without Extracted Features 
Along with the conventional signatures used by the antiviruses for malware 
detection, this tool generates features that are not usually extracted by analysis 
tools and not as well used for generally detecting a malicious file. This not only 
makes this module unique, it also allows the classification module to use machine 
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learning algorithms on a unique and more relevant feature-set making the 
detection more accurate with much lesser probability of false positives.  
We discussed the significance of packers and how malware authors use packers. 
Our analysis module not only identifies that the file under analysis is packed, it 
also identifies the name and version of the packer, along with using a third-party 
API to check the legitimacy of that specific packer. Additionally, our analysis 
module uses an updated list of packers generally used by malware [107] and the 
list is updated automatically with the help of the API. It is also used to identify if 
the analyzed malware is a variant of previously analyzed malware or belongs to 
a similar family of malware. The list of packers is stored in the database, which 
has a list of both malicious and legitimate packers updated frequently with every 
analysis supported by external API.  
Some of the analysis tools extract the suspected API that the malware might try 
to access while executing. Similarly, our tool also extracts such APIs and to make 
the detection more accurate, we store the detected APIs in our database divided 
into clean APIs and malicious APIs. Therefore, when the analysis module 
extracts the APIs from a file it can be checked whether it’s a malicious or non-
malicious file and if the local database doesn’t have any of the detected APIs the 
external sources are requested for legitimacy of the detected APIs.  
Like APIs, our analysis module also extracts all the IPs the analyzed file is 
supposed to connect once it’s executed. Such IP addresses may belong to a set 
of command and control servers controlling a botnet or something similarly 
malicious. These extracted IP addresses are stored in the database with two 
classes of IP addresses; clean and malicious, and then later matched whether 
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the detected IP address is malicious or clean. The database is continuously 
updated with every analysis.  
The vital features from individual analysis are stored in the database and allows 
the system to identify a variant of an existing or previously analyzed malware. 
With the help of stored features, such as; hashes, packers, APIs, and IP 
addresses, the analysis module identifies if the currently analyzed file is a variant 
of previously analyzed malware.  
As mentioned earlier, to endorse our results and initial classifications, we use 
external API powered by VirusTotal. With the help of this API we can implement 
the conventional detection techniques used by antiviruses by running the 
samples against an external engine comprising of 57 antiviruses. This API 
provides us with a verdict based on its own analysis, which plays a significant 
role in identifying the malicious file. 
3.3.2 Machine Learning 
The features extracted through static analysis play a significant part in the 
proposed framework. These features are then used to apply three different 
machine learning techniques used in this framework. The features extracted from 
PE files contain both malicious and clean features, which are divided into 
corresponding fields. We then use SVM (Support Vector Machine), decision tree, 
and boosting on decision tree to identify a malicious file. 
3.3.2.1 SVM 
Support vector machines, is a training algorithm which presents a decision 
boundary by maximizing the margin amongst training patters. The algorithm 
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presented by [108], has performed in an optimal fashion in many conventional 
scenarios, along with some studies similar to ours [93], [80], [109]. SVM creates 
a linear classifier, therefore, vector of weight 𝑤𝑤��⃗  is its concept description and a 
threshold or an intercept, 𝑏𝑏. To make the problem linearly separable, a kernel 
function is used by the SVMs for mapping training data into a higher-dimensioned 
space. To set 𝑤𝑤��⃗  and 𝑏𝑏 that hyperplane’s margin is ideal, quadratic programming 
is used, which means that distance to the closest examples of negative and 
positive classes is maximum from the hyperplane. While running, if 〈𝑤𝑤��⃗  . ?⃗?𝑥〉 − 𝑏𝑏 >0, positive class is predicted and if vice versa negative class is selected by the 
method. However, for larger set of problems, quadratic programming can be 
complex and expensive, whereas, to train SVM efficiently, SMO (Sequential 
Minimal Optimization) is a much better algorithm [110], it computes the 
probability of positive and negative class during execution [111]. For 
performance, we used implementation proposed in [111] for computing each 
class’s probability and then we used positive class’s probability as the rating. We 
used the following linear SVM formula to predict the positive classes:  
𝑡𝑡(𝑥𝑥) =  ∑ 𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛 𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) + 𝜔𝜔0 (1) 
Where 𝑡𝑡(𝑥𝑥) is the class label, which is either +1 (malicious) or -1 (benign), n=1 to 
N represent the sum of sample from 1 to N,  𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛 𝐾𝐾(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) is the weight of SVM and 
the kernel dot product and 𝜔𝜔0 is the bias.  
3.3.2.2 Decision Tree 
A decision tree is decision support mechanism with nodes that represent 
attributes and the leaf nodes that represent the class labels. Branches of the tree 
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that lead to children represent the values of the attribute. Values of the attributes 
and those attributes of an instance are used by the performance element to 
navigate in a tree starting from root and leading to leaves or an individual leaf. By 
choosing the attribute that perfectly separates the training samples into their 
appropriate classes, this is how a learning element generates a tree. Node, 
branches, and children are created for the attribute and the value of the attribute, 
the attribute is then eliminated from additional consideration, and the examples 
are distributed to the relevant child node [112]. This process runs in a loop until 
the same class examples are stored in a node and then class label is stored. 
Many implementation of decision trees remove subtrees which are expected to 
perform inaccurately on test samples, which avoids the overtraining of the whole 
algorithm. We have used MATLAB decision tree implementation for training and 
testing. 
3.3.2.3 Boosting 
Boosting is used for combining multiple classifiers to enhance the performance 
as compare to individual classifiers [113]. It uses ensemble methods, which 
significantly increase the overall performance, which has been tested and 
endorsed by many studies [114], [115], [116], [117]. By repetitively learning from 
a weighted dataset of a model, it creates a set of weighted models by assessing, 
and revising the dataset based on the performance of the model. During 
execution of the method, to predict the highest weight class, it uses a set of 
models and their weights. We only applied boosting on decision tree 
implementation, as our initial experiments didn’t show any significance of 
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applying boosting on SVM. We used AdaBoost.M1 algorithm’s [113] 
implementation in MATLAB to boost decision tree. 
3.4 Proposed Framework Design 
In the earlier section, we discussed the anomalies found when malware samples 
were statically analyzed. These anomalies play a vital role when combined to 
detect any previously known or unknown malware. However, relying on just these 
file anomalies is not enough to accurately detect a malicious file or an attack. As 
mentioned earlier, conventional detection techniques used by antiviruses are 
also important, if not sufficient, to differentiate between a legitimate and 
illegitimate file. If a framework is developed, which learns from the data retrieved 
through static analysis and conventional detection mechanisms then it will be 
able to accurately detect any malicious activity even if it was previously unknown. 
Therefore, we propose an intelligent malware detection framework, which 
integrates the mechanism of retrieving features and signatures through static 
analysis with conventional detection techniques used by multiple antiviruses 
along with three quite effective machine learning algorithms. This unique 
combination not only makes the whole process more reliable, it will make the 
detection mechanism more decisive and accurate. 
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Figure 3.5: Proposed Framework Design [112] 
Figure 3.5 presents the design of the proposed framework, which is comprised 
of two main components supported by the repository containing the clean 
malicious files. The analysis module performs static analysis of clean and 
malicious files generating comprehensive reports, which are then used by the 
classification module. The classification module uses machine learning 
algorithms to intelligently differentiate between clean and malicious files [106]. 
3.4.1 The Analysis Module 
The analysis module comprises of the feature extraction tool, which statically 
analyzes portable executable files and generate a comprehensive set of 
heuristics based on the algorithms that are discussed in the later section. 
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3.4.1.1 Preparing a File 
As illustrated in Figure 3.5 in the analysis module once the file is retrieved from 
the repository it is prepared for the analysis, which is extremely important and 
this technique is usually not present in other automated static analysis tools. The 
malicious files that are caught from the wild apparently use multiple obfuscation 
techniques, such techniques divert the analyst attention from the main file by 
placing multiple non-malicious files with garbage data stored in a zipped folder, 
which facilitates in generating ambiguous results if not removed. This, although, 
looks like a trivial step, but it makes the analysis more efficient, reliable and avoid 
any irrelevant analysis reports to be processed and stored in the database. 
3.4.1.2 Extracting Features 
The main function of this module is to perform a comprehensive static analysis 
of individual files by using a specifically designed static analysis tool and extract 
a rich set of features, which are stored in the respective JSON-based files. 
Although, this is the main function of the analysis module and does perform a 
comprehensive analysis but it doesn’t require a lot of resources for doing so. The 
analysis is performed rapidly without the consumption of noticeable amount of 
CPU resources. 
 
Figure 3.6: Obfuscated Part in Extracted Features 
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3.4.1.3 Removing Obfuscation 
The features extracted after the comprehensive analysis contain a lot of 
parameters along with the obfuscated parts embedded in the malicious file, which 
makes it difficult for any analysis tool to identify the relevant features to classify 
a file as malicious or clean. Additionally, if the obfuscated parts are present in the 
feature set of a file then it will complicate the training of the entire classification 
module. The analysis module, after extracting the features from a file, identifies 
the obfuscation and removes it.  Figure 3.6 presents the eradicated piece from 
the analysis report containing the obfuscated part. After removing the obfuscated 
parts, it reorganizes the contents of the JSON file to make it more 
comprehensible and in a proper sequence for later use. 
3.4.2 The Classification Module 
The classification module is a combination of machine learning algorithms 
applied on the large set of feature heuristics generated by the analysis module. 
Following is the sequence of operation of the classification module. 
3.4.2.1 File Retrieval 
The classification module works based on how well the machine learning 
algorithms are trained. The analysis reports of clean and malicious files 
containing their feature heuristics are stored in the analysis repository. Each file 
is retrieved and transferred to the classification part of the project. 
3.4.2.2 Classification Techniques 
This is the primary part of the classification module, which simultaneously runs 
the machine learning algorithms to differentiate between clean and malicious 
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files. The features presented earlier in Figure 3.4, are used to train support vector 
machine, decision tree, and boosting. SVM and decision tree run simultaneously, 
whereas, boosting is applied on decision tree to strengthen the weak classifiers. 
The implementation of these techniques is defined in the later section. 
3.4.2.3 Classification Module Final Verdict 
The final verdict of the classification module is based on the outcome of the 
machine learning algorithms. There are three algorithms using different 
techniques for classification in this module, the consensus from these algorithms 
generates the verdict, which is the final verdict of the entire framework. This 
verdict decides that whether a file is clean or malicious. 
3.5 Modelling the Analysis Module 
This section presents the design and implementation details of the analysis 
module. We will discuss the individual steps that are combined to form this 
module and the algorithms on which each step is based. Table 3.4 presents the 
notation used in the algorithms.   
Table 3.4: Notations used in Algorithms 
Notation Meaning 
𝐹𝐹 Set of all files 
𝑓𝑓 A single file 
𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 Dataset containing all malware 
samples 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 Dataset containing all clean samples 
𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 Dataset containing analysis reports of 
all malware samples 
𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 Dataset containing analysis reports of 
all clean samples 
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𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 Extracted features of a single clean file 
𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹 Extract features 
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 Single malicious file 
𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 Single clean file 
𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 Extracted features of a single 
malicious file 
𝑂𝑂𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 Obfuscated elements in extracted 
features 
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Identified malicious features 
𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 Identified clean features 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Database of malicious features 
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Database of clean features 
𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻ℎ(𝑓𝑓) Hashes of a file �𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆1, 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆256, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀5� 
𝑓𝑓(𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) Function to call external API 
𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 Hashes of malicious file pulled from 
external API �𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆1, 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆256, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀5� 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻ℎ(𝑓𝑓) Hashes of individual sections in a file 
�𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆1, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀5� 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑓𝑓) IP addresses present in a file 
𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 Malicious IP address pulled from 
external API 
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑓𝑓) Packer used by a file 
𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 Packer used by malware endorsed by 
external API 
𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  Malicious API identified through 
external API 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑓𝑓) APIs extracted from a file 
�𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀, 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑓𝑓) URL extracted from a file 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 Compile time 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 Anti-debug API 
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𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 Anti-VM API 
𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Malicious URL identified through 
external API 
𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 External verdict  
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 Final verdict 
 
The analysis module not only extracts features of individual files, it also provides 
a verdict about the legitimacy of each file. The verdict provided by this module is 
based on a thorough process involving an external verdict supported by the 
private API of VirusTotal.com and an internal verdict based on a comprehensive 
decision-making matrix, which is discussed later in this section. There are series 
of different phases that complete this module and conclude the tasks that are 
required from it. Every individual file goes through these phases before it is 
classified as safe or malicious by this module. 
Phase 1: File Retrieval and Feature Extraction 
The whole process of analysis module starts with this phase where the module 
pulls an individual file from the repository. The module is connected to a 
repository that is divided into two separate sub-repositories; one for malicious 
and one for clean files. The module runs simultaneously in two different 
instances; one instance retrieves the malicious files 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 from the malicious 
repository 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 and the other one retrieves the clean files 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 from the clean 
repository 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 as described in Algorithm 1. After every individual file is retrieved, 
a through static analysis is performed and a rich set of features are extracted. 
The extracted features of an individual malicious or clean file 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 and 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 
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respectively are stored in their respective repository 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 and𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶. The extracted 
features of an individual file from any of the two classes contain;        𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹 ⟵ 
�Hash, lib, IP, packer, secinfo, antidbg, antivm, API, URL�, which are stored as 
individual JSON reports. Many of modern malware samples have include 
obfuscated strings to avoid getting analyzed, if the analysis module finds any 
obfuscated code or strings during analysis, it eliminates it and rearranges the 
whole report for further phases.   
Algorithm 1: Feature Extraction 
Input: Malicious and Clean File 𝒇𝒇𝒎𝒎 and 𝒇𝒇𝒄𝒄 from 𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴 and 𝑭𝑭𝑪𝑪 
Output: Extracted Features of Malware and Clean files 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎      
and 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒄𝒄 
Procedure: 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎 in 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴 && 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒄𝒄 in 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑪𝑪 
do  
     𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭 of  𝒇𝒇  in 𝑭𝑭 where  𝑭𝑭 ⟵ {𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑪𝑪} 
        𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭 ⟵ �𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡, 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥, 𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈, 𝐩𝐩𝐡𝐡𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩, 𝐡𝐡𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢, 𝐡𝐡𝐢𝐢𝐚𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐝𝐝𝐥𝐥𝐝𝐝, 𝐡𝐡𝐢𝐢𝐚𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐯𝐯𝐯𝐯, 𝐀𝐀𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈, 𝐔𝐔𝐔𝐔𝐔𝐔� 
 
while  
       𝑭𝑭 count > 0 && 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎 ∄ 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴 || 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒄𝒄 ∄  𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑪𝑪             // 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎 ∄ 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴 means there is no repition of extracted features 
of a single file 
if     
𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎 ∃ 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎   
 then        
      remove 𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎       
        return 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎 
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Phase 2: Populating Database with Clean and Malicious Features 
After the features are extracted and analysis reports are generated, the next step 
is to identify the clean and malicious features in both the repositories. The 
features are identified by two different techniques; through data already stored in 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 containing a rich set of malicious features and with the help of external 
API. The data already stored in the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷was retrieved through a comprehensive 
analysis of around one million malware samples. The functionalities of this phase 
are also described in Algorithm 2.  
As presented in Algorithm 2, after retrieving the analysis report of each file from 
its respective repository, which contains the extracted features. The algorithm 
matches the individual features by treating them as a separate entity. In this 
specific phase, the module extracts the hashes 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻ℎ(𝑓𝑓) ⟵ {𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆1, 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆256, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀5} from a single analysis report that is initially checked from 
the local database. If the local database of malicious features does not contain 
the 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻ℎ(𝑓𝑓) the request is sent to the external API, which returns the request by 
either classifying it as true (malicious) or false (non-malicious). If the request is 
returned with true then the 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻ℎ(𝑓𝑓) is stored in the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 and the response is 
sent to the next part of the module, which is responsible for the verdict. If the 
request is returned with a false then the 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻ℎ(𝑓𝑓) is stored in the 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷. The 
next feature that is checked is ℎ(𝑓𝑓) ⟵ {𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆1, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀5}, which is similarly matched 
end procedure 
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as the previous one as presented in the Algorithm 2. This process is continued 
for three more features 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑓𝑓), 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇),  where 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ⟵  
�𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀, 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�, and 𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼(𝒇𝒇). Each of these features are separately 
matched with the local and external sources and the results if retrieved from the 
external source are stored in the local database and forwarded to the next phase.  
Algorithm 2: Populating Database of Clean and Malicious Features through 
External API 
Input: 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎 in 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴 && 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒄𝒄 in 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑪𝑪 
Output: 𝒇𝒇𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 in 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 && 𝒇𝒇𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄 in 𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 
procedure: featureidentification(f) 
pull  𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎 in 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴 || 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒄𝒄 in 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑪𝑪 
             
 return 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒎𝒎 || 𝑬𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒄𝒄 
Hash Matching 
𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) ⟵ {𝑺𝑺𝑯𝑯𝑨𝑨𝑺𝑺, 𝑺𝑺𝑯𝑯𝑨𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺, 𝑴𝑴𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺} 
𝒇𝒇(𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨) 
  if  
    𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) ∄ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 && 𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) ∃ 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 
   then  
    𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫       else 
    𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫      end if return 𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) 
Section Matching 
𝑺𝑺𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) 
𝒇𝒇(𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨) 
  if  
    𝑺𝑺𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) ∄ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 && 𝑺𝑺𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) ∃ 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎        then             𝑺𝑺𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇)  ∈ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫    else        𝑺𝑺𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫      
return 𝑺𝑺𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝑯𝑯𝒎𝒎𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯(𝒇𝒇) 
Packer Matching 
 𝑨𝑨𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇) 
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𝒇𝒇(𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨) 
   if  
     𝑨𝑨𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇) ∄ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 && 𝑨𝑨𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇) ∃ 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑷𝑷𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎          then              𝑨𝑨𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫          else               𝑨𝑨𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫           end if  return 𝑨𝑨𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇)  
API Matching 
𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ⟵ �𝑨𝑨𝒄𝒄𝑬𝑬𝒅𝒅𝑶𝑶𝒅𝒅, 𝑨𝑨𝒄𝒄𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑽𝑽𝑴𝑴, 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎� 
𝒇𝒇(𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨) 
  if 
     𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ∄ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 && 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ∃ 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 
  then  
     𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫   else       𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫   end if return 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) 
URL Matching 
𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼(𝒇𝒇) 
𝒇𝒇(𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨) 
  if 
     𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼(𝒇𝒇) ∄ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 && 𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼(𝒇𝒇) ∃ 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 
  then  
     𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫   else       𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫   end if return 𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼(𝒇𝒇) 
 
IP Matching 
𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) 
𝒇𝒇(𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨) 
  if 
     𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ∄ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 && 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ∃ 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 
  then  
     𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫   else       𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) ∈ 𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 
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  end if return 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒇𝒇) 
 
Phase 3: The Verdict  
The verdict is the last phase of this module, which basically presents a decision 
on a file that whether it is malicious or clean. The decision taken on the legitimacy 
of a file goes through a rigorous mechanism before it is finalized. This final verdict 
is based on two main conclusions; a) the external and b) the internal or final 
verdict, both decisions follow some defined principles. 
Phase 3.1: The External Verdict 
The external conclusion is based on the report retrieved through the private API 
of VirusTotal.com, which is the accumulated decision of 57 antiviruses but the 
decision that is returned as a response from this external source isn’t always 
100% positive or negative. Therefore, we further added constraints on the 
response from the external source before adding it as a decision in this module. 
According to our constraints, if the response coming back is positive more than 
40% then the module considers it as a positive response, where positive means 
malicious. If the response is less than 40% then the module considers it as a 
negative response. The reason behind setting the threshold to 40% is that on 
many instances antiviruses suffer with high false-positive rates because they 
identify legitimate applications from unknown publishers as malicious and block 
them causing inconvenience for the users. Consequently, not many antiviruses 
make this mistake on similar type of files therefore there is a disagreement 
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between antiviruses over such file types and to avoid high false-positive rate 40% 
threshold level was decided.  
Phase 3.2: The Internal Verdict 
The internal verdict is more rigorous and deals with a larger number of 
parameters based on which the legitimacy of each file is decided. The matrix 
presented in Table 3.5 defines the idea behind the final decision-making process 
of this module that is based on many elements present in the local 𝑴𝑴𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 and 
𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫. These elements that are primarily part of the analysis reports of 
different files from both the categories are individually considered and 
accumulated in different combinations to finalize the verdict. In 21 out of 33 cases 
final verdict is contradicting with the external verdict, which means that the matrix 
presented in Table 3.5 does not only rely on the outcome of 57 antiviruses and 
consider the rest of parameters used by this decision-making mechanism equally 
important. In the decision-making matrix, “T” (true) means that the file is malicious 
and “F” (false) means that the file is safe. The matrix presented in Table 3.5 uses 
a novel approach of detecting malware with rigorous heuristic matching.  
Table 3.5: Decision Making Matrix for Analysis Module 
 
Hash Lib IP Packer Section Anti_dbg Anti_vm API URL Ext_ver Inter_ver 
Case 
1 
T T T T T T T T T T T 
Case 
2 
F T T T T T T T T T T 
Case 
3 
F F T T T T T T T T T 
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Case 
4 
F F F T T T T T T T T 
Case 
5 
F F F F T T T T T T T 
Case 
6 
F F F F F T T T T T T 
Case 
7 
F F F F F F T T T T T 
Case 
8 
F F F F F F F T T T T 
Case 
9 
F F F F F F F F T T T 
Case 
10 
F F F F F F F F F T F 
Case 
11 
F F F F F F F F F F F 
Case 
12 
T F F F F F F F F F T 
Case 
13 
T T F F F F F F F F T 
Case 
14 
T T T F F F F F F F T 
Case 
15 
T T T T F F F F F F T 
Case 
16 
T T T T T F F F F F T 
Case 
17 
T T T T T T F F F F T 
Case 
18 
T T T T T T T F F F T 
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Case 
19 
T T T T T T T T F F T 
Case 
20 
T T T T T T T T T F T 
Case 
21 
F F F F F F F T T F T 
Case 
22 
F F F F F F T T T F T 
Case 
23 
F F F F F T T T T F T 
Case 
24 
F F F F T T T T T F T 
Case 
25 
F F F T T T T T T F T 
Case 
26 
F F T T T T T T T F T 
Case 
27 
F T T T T T T T T F T 
Case 
28 
F F F T F F F F F T F 
Case 
29 
F F F T F T T F F T F 
Case 
30 
F T F T T F F F F T F 
Case 
31 
F T F T T T T F F F F 
Case 
32 
F F T F F F F T T F T 
Case 
33 
F F T F F F F F F F T 
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3.6 Evaluating the Analysis Module 
We initially evaluated the analysis module to separately identify its malware 
detection capabilities. In this evaluation, we also compared the results of the 
analysis module with the 57 antiviruses used by Virustotal.com by using the same 
dataset for both. Separately evaluating the analysis module and comparing it with 
conventional malware detection techniques will not only endorse the level of 
competence of the proposed framework on the modular level, it will also highlight 
the possible weaknesses that can be eliminated in the classification module. 
3.6.1 Data Collection and Experiment Environment 
The data for this research consisted of 150000 malicious files and 87000 benign 
executables of Windows PE format. The benign executables were retrieved from 
fresh installation of Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 10, Windows Server 2008, 
and Windows Server 2012. The malicious files present in the malware repository 
were obtained from our industrial partner Nettitude, which was a combination of 
different malware types. The distribution of both type of files is presented in Table 
3.6. 
Table 3.6: Distribution of Benign and Malicious Files 
1 Benign  87000 
2 Malicious 150000 
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Figure 3.7: Malware Distribution in the Repository 
The experiment environment was like the one discussed in the earlier part of this 
chapter, also presented in Table 3.7, but this time instead of using a standard 
static analysis tool, we tested the entire analysis module equipped with a 
customized and fully automated analysis tool with decision-making mechanism. 
The dataset was smaller than the one used in the initial experiment but it was 
comprised of unique and more recent samples. The dataset used in this set of 
experiments comprised of both malicious and clean files stored in their respective 
repositories. Figure 3.7 presents types of malware used in the experiments and 
their weightage in the dataset. The main idea behind this experiment was to 
evaluate the level of accuracy of the analysis module while it differentiates 
between clean and malicious files. 
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Table 3.7: Test Bench Details 
Tool/Machine Details 
Host Machine Dell PowerEdge T630 Xeon E5-2609V4 1.7GHz 32GB 
RAM 1TB HDD 5U Tower Server  
Operating System Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, 64 bit 
Static Analysis Tool Automated Analysis Module with feature identification 
and decision-making mechanism 
Total Number of 
Samples 
237000 (combined; benign + malicious) 
 
3.6.2 Experiment Results and Analysis 
The experiments performed by testing 237000 files against the analysis module 
returned some remarkable results. The results achieved form this experiment 
helped to evaluate two techniques by using a dataset of clean and malicious files. 
The results show the effectiveness of the analysis module for detection of 
malicious files, it also evaluates the effectiveness of conventional detection 
techniques used by antiviruses. As discussed earlier, the results received from 
the detection module are a combination of conventional detection techniques, 
thorough static analysis, and a decision-making matrix. The experiments 
performed, help to compare the results of both the techniques and identify the 
difference between their overall performances. The results discussed in the 
subsections are divided into two main categories; 1) the analysis module and 2) 
CHAPTER 3 
80 
 
antiviruses, the results shown under the label of antiviruses present the average 
reports of 57 antiviruses that are implemented by virustotal.com. 
3.6.2.1 Understanding the Test on a Single File 
This section discusses the analysis report of single files from both the categories. 
We performed the analysis on both malicious and clean files simultaneously and 
analysed the initial results to understand and evaluate the outcome and 
performance of our approach.  Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 present the analysis 
report for individual malicious and clean files respectively, which explains the 
parameters used and their significance in the decision-making process. Both 
these tables show the 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 and the rest of the parameters that are integrated 
based on the rules defined in the decision-making matrix to formulate the 
𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑. The report of a single malicious file has a combination of outcomes 
present in green and red but the 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 is malicious, which means that the 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑓𝑓) classified as malicious by the internal analysis based on the database of 
malicious URLs is not present as a malicious URL in the database of external 
source or not present in its database at all.  This show the combination of both 
the approaches and the difference it makes while deciding on the legitimacy of 
each analysed file. 
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Table 3.8: Analysis Report of a Single Malicious File 
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Table 3.9: Analysis Report of a Clean File
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3.6.2.2 Comparing Malware Detection Performance of the Analysis Module and 
Antiviruses 
In this section, we thoroughly discuss and compare the performance of the 
analysis module proposed and implemented in this study with the conventional 
detection techniques from different aspects. The main objective was to design a 
method that uses the conventional detection techniques and introduce additional 
techniques that could enhance the overall detection rate. The comparison 
presented in Figure 3.8 illustrate the significant difference between the detection 
rate of the analysis module and the detection rate of antiviruses. The difference 
of 23.7% between the two approaches highlights the proof of performance 
enhancements in the analysis module, which detected 87.3% of the 150000 
unique malware samples. This not just proves that the analysis module has a 
higher detection rate as compared to the conventional techniques, it also makes 
it more precise. 
The evaluations are performed based on the following equations:  
False Positive Rate (FPR): negative samples classified as positive. 
FPR = FPTN
FP
+          
Recall/ True Positive Rate: actual positive samples detected.  
Recall =    FNTP
TP
+          
Precision/ Positive Predictive Value (PPV): actual positive samples for all the 
positive detections.  
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Precision/ PPV =  FPTP
TP
+           
Accuracy: a measure of the true detections. 
Accuracy (ACC) = FNFPTNTP
TNTP
+++
+
       
 
 
Figure 3.8: Detection Rate Comparison between Analysis Module and 
Antiviruses 
Results presented in Figure 3.9 compare the difference between the two 
approaches in terms of TP, TN, FP, and FN. The figure identifies that apart from 
the true positive rate of both the approaches, the analysis module has higher 
accuracy in identifying the benign files as non-malicious with a 6% higher rate. 
The FP and FN comparison also shows a higher level of accuracy by the 
proposed approach. 
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Figure 3.9: TP, TN, FP, FN Comparison 
 
Figure 3.10: Accuracy, Precision, and Recall Comparison of both Approaches 
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Figure 3.11: Comparison of Detection Rate with Respect to Malware Types 
The comparison of results presented in Figure 3.8, Figure 3.9, Figure 3.10, and 
Figure 3.11 illustrate the outcomes of both the approaches and identifies efficacy 
of the analysis module. In Figure 3.11, we have presented detection rate with 
respect to different malware types that were present in the repository. This 
comparison presents an interesting set of numbers, which shows the 
weaknesses of conventional techniques and strengths of our approach in specific 
areas. The antiviruses result show that they perform comparatively well while 
detecting some specific types of malware such as; spyware and worm. However, 
the conventional approach didn’t perform well while detecting viruses, 
downloader, and trojan. Trojans are in majority in our repository and in the wild, 
however, antiviruses combined were only able to detect 59% of these files, 
whereas, the analysis module detected 87% of trojans. This difference of 22% in 
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detecting trojan is significant and demonstrate the strengths of the proposed 
module.  
As discussed earlier, the analysis module is combination of conventional 
detection techniques and a decision-making matrix. The decision-making matrix 
calculates the final verdict based on the parameters generated through 
comprehensive static analysis and external API, which gives the verdict of 57 
antiviruses. The difference in performance of commercial antiviruses and the 
analysis module shows the effectiveness of the decision-making matrix. The 
decision-making matrix has not only enhanced the overall detection rate, it has 
also enhanced the level of accuracy in detecting different types of malware. 
However, if the numbers in Figure 3.8, Figure 3.9, and Figure 3.10 are compared 
and analysed, it is understandable that although the performance is much better 
as compared to the conventional technique, the analysis module doesn’t have 
the optimal output. The 9% and 12% false positive and negative are still quite 
high if real world scenarios such as enterprise networks are considered. To lower 
the numbers of false positives and negatives and further enhance the positive 
detection, it is required to add a layer that could use a different type of scrutinizing 
procedure. 
3.7 Evaluating the Framework 
Previous sections present the details of architecture and methodology of the 
approach we have proposed in this research. In this section, we present the 
observations of multiple experiments performed to evaluate the methodology 
proposed. We performed four different experiments on a standard experimental 
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design to help us evaluate the methodology from different aspects. In our first 
experiments, we used a smaller dataset of both benign and malicious 
executables and applied all the classification techniques. In the second 
experiments, we used a larger dataset to apply the classification techniques to 
monitor the enhancement in the detection rate. In the third experiment, we 
introduced obfuscated malicious files that are previously unknown and make the 
overall dataset much larger, which allowed us to observe the performance of the 
classification techniques against a much difficult dataset. The fourth experiment 
was performed on real-time data where we left the system running for more than 
two months. 
3.7.1 Experimental Design 
To validate the classification techniques used in this framework and generate 
unbiased classification reports, we implemented stratified ten-fold cross-
validation. The cross-validation technique assesses the predictive models by 
distributing the dataset of samples into two sets; one for training and one for 
testing. This technique is executed based on K-folds and the original sample is 
divided into K size subsamples. Out of these K size subsets, one of the subset is 
kept for testing and K-1 subsets are used for training purpose. The whole process 
of cross-validation is reiterated K times to ensure that each of the subset is used 
exactly once as a testing set. The results after the process are then accumulated 
and averaged to calculate a final estimation. The main benefit of this technique 
is that all the samples are used for both training and testing processes and each 
of the sample is used for testing exactly once, which removes any chances of 
biased calculation and validates the predictive model rigorously.  
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To further evaluate the model, we used a formal analysis technique known as 
ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) analysis [118], which presented the 
true-positive rate of the model against the false positive rate. 
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3.7.1.1 Small Dataset 
 
Figure 3.12: ROC curves for malware classification from a small dataset 
 
 
 
Table 3.10: Result of applying classification techniques on extracted features of 
a smaller dataset 
Method Area Under Curve (AUC) 
Decision Tree 0.9708 
SVM 0.9727 
Boosting 0.9747 
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3.7.1.2 Large Dataset 
 
Figure 3.13: ROC Curves ROC curves for malware classification from a Large 
Dataset 
 
 
Table 3.11: Result of applying classification techniques on extracted features of 
a large dataset 
Method Area Under Curve (AUC) 
Decision Tree  0.9775 
SVM 0.9896 
Boosting 0.9969 
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3.7.1.3 Obfuscated Dataset 
 
Figure 3.14: ROC curves for malware classification from Obfuscated Dataset 
 
 
Table 3.12: Result of applying classification techniques on extracted features of 
a obfuscated dataset 
Method Area Under Curve (AUC) 
Decision Tree  0.9740 
SVM  0.9823 
Boosting  0.9910 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
93 
 
 
3.7.1.4 Real-Time Detection 
 
Figure 3.15: ROC curves for malware classification from Real-Time Detection 
 
 
Table 3.13: Result of applying classification techniques on extracted features 
from real-time detection 
Method Area Under Curve (AUC) 
Decision Tree AUC1 0.9765 
SVM AUC 0.9892 
Boosting AUC2 0.9963 
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3.7.2 Discussion 
We performed four different experiments to evaluate the performance of our 
framework. The results presented in the previous section prove that the 
classification methodology proposed in this chapter satisfy the initial hypothesis 
of accurate malware detection. The first experiment tested the framework with a 
smaller dataset to understand the effectiveness of the overall approach.  
After extracting the features, all the parameters required to perform the 
experiments were achieved. We separated a set of 500 files from each category 
to conduct the initial experiment by starting with ten-fold cross-validation and then 
applying classification techniques. The ROC curves of this experiment are 
presented in Figure 3.12 and the areas under curves are presented in Table 3.10. 
It can be observed from the table that applying boosting on Decision Tree 
enhance the outcome. Decision tree achieved an AUC of 0.9708 while SVM and 
boosting achieved 0.9727 and 0.9747 respectively. The experiment performed 
on the small sample of clean and malicious files gave a satisfactory output 
considering the learning samples were just 500, which shows that the 
classification techniques proposed in this research have the potential to perform 
much better if they are well trained with higher number of samples.  
The results achieved from the experiments performed on the smaller dataset 
were satisfactory, but not better than the similar experiments performed by [85], 
[93], which achieved a better AUC as compare to our approach. However, the 
reason our initial experiment lack better AUC was the scarcity in training and 
testing dataset, which required a higher number of features for training. This was 
proved in the second experiment performed on a large dataset.  
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The results of second experiment presented in Figure 3.13 and Table 3.11 show 
remarkable improvement over the previous experiment and comparing to [93], 
[85]. SVM achieved a better rate than decision tree but the implementation of 
boosting on decision tree significantly enhanced the performance by producing a 
much higher detection rate. As discussed earlier, boosting can enhance the 
performance of unstable classifiers by decreasing their variance and bias but it 
can work inversely on stable classifiers [113], which is why we only applied 
boosting on decision tree and not on SVM.  
Our experimental results prove that the proposed methodology can scale in 
performance on a larger set of files. The training and testing performed on larger 
dataset was extremely rigorous because of the feature set and techniques used, 
which also proved that modern obfuscated malware can also be identified with 
accuracy, as illustrated in Figure 3.14 and Table 3.12, presenting the result of 
applying techniques on obfuscated dataset. Evaluating classification 
methodologies based on machine learning against obfuscated and mutated 
dataset has not been performed by [93], [85] and many studies [109], [91], [90], 
[119], [120], [102], [121]. This also shows the versatility of our approach and its 
application on dealing with multiple security threats and can identify not just 
known but it can also predict unknown threats accurately.  
To evaluate the methodology against live threats, we left the entire system 
running for more than four months. The main objective behind this experiment 
was to evaluate the framework against live and unknown threats. The proposed 
methodology showed extremely good results outperforming [93], in their similar 
experiments of real-time detection of malware. The proposed framework 
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achieved a highest of 0.9963 AUC from boosting, followed by 0.9892 and 0.9765 
from SVM and decision tree respectively, as presented in Figure 3.15 and Table 
3.13. 
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CHAPTER 4. AN ENERGY EFFICIENT HOSTING MODEL FOR THE 
MALWARE DETECTION FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction 
In the current era of technology, securing an enterprise network or even an 
individual computer against different types of advance malware attacks is 
becoming extremely resource intensive [122]. If an enterprise is willing to spend 
a lot of resources to acquire tools and licenses for sophisticated network 
monitoring and protection then surely, they can enhance the level of security of 
their organizational network but at the same time such tools require a serious 
amount of resources, such as; dedicated servers, network bandwidth, continuous 
log management, trained human resources, etc [122], [123]. Similarly, a common 
user faces the similar type of threats on a smaller scale that are much difficult to 
identify. Such users can only acquire a license or subscription for an antivirus to 
protect personal data and other digital valuables against sophisticated attacks 
[124].   
When it comes to higher security performance versus resource efficiency, there 
is always a tradeoff but the most important aspect of such scenario is how the 
impact of that tradeoff can be minimized. In the previous chapter, we discussed 
the malware detection capabilities of antiviruses and their effectiveness in the 
case of a malware attack. Another thing that is pivotal in this scenario is the 
impact of antiviruses on the host computers. Lack of malware detection 
capabilities is not the only problem in antiviruses, while scanning the host 
computers for malicious software these security software consume a significant 
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amount of CPU resources of the host machines. Operating systems give priority 
to antiviruses to perform their tasks and while doing so the OS is left with fewer 
resources, which makes the system vulnerable against several different threats. 
This means that not only the conventional security mechanism has a weak 
scanning outcome, it also implies that while performing a scan the antivirus is 
making the host system more vulnerable against several different threats.  
The framework proposed in the previous chapter proves the initial hypothesis of 
enhanced accuracy in malware detection but the framework only solves half of 
the problem. To make the framework a complete solution that can replace 
conventional detection tools and techniques a hosting model is required that can 
cater the operational needs of the proposed framework. The primary objective 
while designing the hosting model was to use an approach which is less resource 
intensive and highly responsive, especially in a real-time scenario.  The hosting 
model should be able to distribute the resource intensive tasks in an efficient way 
that would avoid burdening the host computer.  
The approach discussed in this chapter is an amalgamation of different cloud-
based services. In this approach, we present a comprehensive cloud-based 
architecture to host the intelligent malware detection framework discussed in the 
previous chapter along with a lightweight client powered by a rich engine running 
the malware detection framework. The client agent works as service, which 
replicates some of the main services of the framework for independent malware 
detection. 
In the following sections of this chapter, we have evaluated conventional 
antiviruses followed by the description of the building blocks used to design and 
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implement the hosting model. After building blocks, design and implementation 
of the hosting model is presented, which is followed by the deployment of the 
malware detection framework on the hosting model. The next section presents a 
thorough discussion on the performance evaluation of both aspects of the hosting 
model, which is then compared by similar evaluation performed on conventional 
antiviruses.  
4.2 Evaluation of Conventional Antiviruses CPU Utilization 
It is important to evaluate the performance of current security mechanisms, 
specifically antiviruses, before presenting a solution. Majority of antiviruses 
currently leading the industry are host based, which means that they perform their 
signature generation, comparison, storage, and other resource intensive tasks 
on the host machine. Even the antiviruses that claim to be cloud-based perform 
some of the resource intensive tasks on the clients’ computers. We selected 
eleven mostly used antiviruses and evaluated them against the repository of 
clean and malicious files to identify their CPU utilization. The experiment lasted 
for five hours, same dataset was used for all antiviruses evaluated, and 
antiviruses were running on 11 separate computers [18].   
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Figure 4.1: Evaluation Graph of 11 Antiviruses 
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The graph presented in Figure 4.1 [18] illustrates the comparison of antiviruses 
while running on scan mode continuously for five hours. The graph represents 
the averages of CPU consumption recorded from all eleven machines every thirty 
minutes. It is quite clear from the comparison that the antiviruses most commonly 
used in industry and personal computers have one of the highest CPU 
consumption in scan modes regardless of their malware detection statistics, 
which are not impressive as well. Antiviruses such as McAfee, Norton, 
Kaspersky, and Bitdefender have one of the highest CPU utilization average, 
which means that while the scan is running the host computer is only left with half 
the resources it originally has. The reason why the evaluation experiments lasted 
for five hours was because we wanted to check whether the CPU utilization 
decreases after the scan is continuously running but there was no noticeable 
change recorded. The antiviruses that claim to rely on their cloud-based engines, 
such as; Panda and Webroot, utilized more than 20% of the CPU in the scan 
mode.  
The evaluation of antiviruses based on the amount of CPU resources they utilize 
reveals that low malware detection rate of antiviruses is not the only issue. The 
framework proposed and discussed in the previous chapter requires a hosting 
model that can overcome the issue of significantly high CPU utilization while 
satisfying all the operational requirements of the framework including the real-
time operational requirements of the framework. 
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4.3 Building Blocks Overview 
As discussed in the earlier section, the approach proposed later in this chapter is 
an amalgamation of different services of cloud infrastructure. We have used 
different cloud services offered by Amazon to design a thorough and scalable 
architecture to host the intelligent malware detection framework. Before 
discussing the design and implementation details of the said architecture, it is 
important to discuss the building blocks used in the proposed architecture. This 
section presents an overview of the building blocks used in this architecture. 
4.3.1 Amazon Web Services 
In this section, we are going to discuss the cloud-based web services we have 
used from Amazon in the proposed architecture. We have used multiple 
instances of three different cloud-based web services and connected them to 
design a cloud-based scalable network capable of hosting and executing 
resource intensive tasks. Following is the description of services we have used: 
4.3.1.1 SQS (Simple Queuing Service) 
Amazon SQS is a purpose-built service for message queues, fully managed by 
Amazon. It works flawlessly between different distributed applications and micro 
servers. Amazon’s SQS has elastic capabilities that allow the queues to 
dynamically scale up or down based on system’s overall requirements [125]. SQS 
allows client application or software components to send, receive, and store 
messages between multiple components without losing any messages or 
needing other connected services to be consistently available throughout [126]. 
This queuing service transports messages with embedded jobs, allowing 
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software components to trigger different functionalities through messages, 
making a distributed system work as a single, well synchronized software 
component. One of the main concerns in queue-based task processing is the 
execution of duplicated messages [127]. SQS FIFO queues are specifically 
designed and configured to ensure at-most-once message processing, with very 
limited throughput and in the same order as delivered. We have used SQS to 
implement the queuing mechanism in the architecture, explained in the later 
section. 
4.3.1.2 EC2 (Elastic Compute Cloud) 
Amazon EC2 is a cloud-based service that offers dynamically resizable 
computing space in the cloud. EC2 is a platform providing virtual dedicated-
server hosting that runs instances of virtual machines also known as AMIs 
(Amazon Machine Images). Amazon offers a rich group of virtual machines 
preconfigured for several different tasks, such as; Ubuntu desktop, Ubuntu 
server, Windows server, etc. [127], [125]. Apart from the virtual machines, the 
primary function of EC2 is the computing platform for the VMs. Amazon offers 
hosting services with different sizes of computing and storage. The size of 
storage and computing can be selected based on the requirements of the hosted 
applications. The most beneficial aspect of EC2 is its elasticity, which allows the 
specific compute plan to dynamically scale if required allowing the hosted 
application to expand in size, network bandwidth, and computing power without 
any hindrance [128]. It uses pay-as-you-go approach and cost the user only for 
the time the service was up and running. Apart from the elasticity benefit, EC2 is 
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extremely quick to setup and launch, it also offers facilities to implement fault 
tolerant mechanism and applications that are resilient to failure [129], [127]. 
4.3.1.3 EFS (Elastic File System) 
As the name suggests, EFS is a file system service with elastic features, which 
offers simple and scalable file storage service. EFS is specifically designed to be 
integrated with EC2 instances to work as a single cloud application [130]. EFS is 
one of the most convenient file system in the cloud and can easily be mounted 
with multiple cloud-based applications. If there is an application hosted on EC2 
and EFS is mounted on that instance, it’ll offer a standard interface for file system 
and access semantics for file system. This allows seamless integration of this file 
system with existing tools and applications. Moreover, a single EFS can be linked 
with multiple applications on EC2 instances or single application on multiple EC2 
instances, allowing a common data source to cater the needs of distributed 
applications [131]. The elastic file system can also be linked with the local 
datacenter that are not linked with the cloud, which can also be used to 
conveniently migrate large data sets to the cloud. The versatility of this service 
allows it to be used for a broader domain range, such as; web applications, media 
processing, enterprise applications and services, big data and analytics, data 
storage, etc. [132]. 
4.4 The Hosting Model 
The idea of developing a framework that implements multiple techniques to 
detect malware and integrates their result to enhance the accuracy in detection 
and consumes significantly less CPU and network resources while doing so, is 
incomplete without a hosting model. The concept of energy efficiency is 
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dependent on how the framework is hosted and the level of its scalability. This 
section presents a cloud-based hosting model, which is not only able to host the 
framework discussed in the previous chapter, it possesses a dynamic behavior 
allowing it to scale itself in runtime without affecting the performance of hosted 
framework. To design and configure the hosting model proposed in this section, 
we have used Amazon’s cloud infrastructure along with its web services. Before 
discussing the model, it is important to understand hosting requirements of the 
malware detection framework.  
The malware detection framework is comprised of three main modules that are 
further divided into submodules and have their separate requirements when it 
comes to hosting them. Following subsections define the individual requirements 
of each module:  
4.4.1 Repository 
The first module in the framework is the repository, the repository is further 
divided into three submodules; clean files repository, malicious files repository, 
and the analysis repository. As the name suggest, all three of these submodules 
store different type of files that are later used by other modules. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the clean and malicious files repositories contain clean and 
malicious files respectively, which are later analyzed. After regular intervals, 
these sub-repositories are populated by a new batch of hundreds of thousands 
of new clean and malicious files stored in their respective repositories. Moreover, 
the analysis repository contains the analysis reports of every clean and malicious 
file separately, with each batch of clean and malicious files stored in the 
repository the same amount of analysis reports is stored in the analysis 
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repository, once the analysis is performed. Therefore, to host such a mechanism, 
a large and secure filesystem is required, however, these repositories not always 
require a huge storage space. The storage is only required when the files are 
present in the repository and once the analysis is performed on all stored files, 
they are not required to be stored. Consequently, having a dedicated large 
storage is not feasible for such mechanism and requires something that is 
available on-demand with high reliability. 
4.4.2 Analysis Module 
Analysis module is the first line of defense while identifying a malware and runs 
a customized tool, which retrieve files from repositories, prepares them to be 
analyzed, extract rich set of features by performing analysis, and removes any 
obfuscation present in the extracted features. Analysis module extract features 
from both clean and malicious files simultaneously, therefore, two instances of 
this module need to be operational concurrently. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the main detection process starts from this module, which means the 
next module is dependent on the outcome of analysis module. Moreover, the 
customized analysis tool running in this module also incorporates external APIs 
to get endorsement on some of the results from external sources, which means 
that there is a requirement of internet connectivity. Based on these requirements, 
the analysis module requires dual instances of a similar server along with reliable 
internet connection. It also requires flexible but reliable system resources, which 
means that the CPU power and memory should be readily available for the 
module but only when required. These resources are only required when the 
analysis module is running and it only runs when there is a new batch of clean 
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and malicious files in the repository or a single file identification is required. 
Therefore, when the analysis module is running the requirements should be 
fulfilled but when it’s not running the hosting platform should be intelligent enough 
to manage the resources. 
4.4.3 The Classification Module 
The classification module is the final phase of the framework and it’s a 
combination of different machine learning algorithms that are applied on the 
analysis reports produced by the analysis module to enhance the level of 
accuracy while identifying clean and malicious files. This module is linked with 
the analysis module through the analysis repository, which is the submodule of 
repository module. Moreover, the machine learning algorithms in the 
classification module run simultaneously to produce the accurate malware and 
benign file identification, which means that dedicated resources are required for 
this module. As discussed in the previous chapter, this module as two aspects 
while operational; first it uses the reports generated from the analysis of large 
number of clean and malicious files to train and test the accuracy of algorithms, 
and secondly it identifies the individual files analyzed separately. This whole 
process with both the aspects is recursive and continuously repeats itself in 
cycles. Therefore, like the analysis module, the classification module also 
requires a hosting platform that is dynamically scalable, cost effective, fault 
tolerant, easily coupled with the other modules.  
The hosting requirements of three main modules of the intelligent malware 
detection framework discussed above clearly highlight the primary needs, which 
will make the framework seamlessly coherent and efficient in terms of 
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performance. There are certain unique and some common requirements for each 
of these modules, the most important things in these set of requirements is that 
all these modules are required to work together as a single unit, two out of the 
three main modules require internet connectivity, and the scalability of resources. 
These main requirements, along with the other requirements discussed above 
are specifically considered when designing the architecture of the hosting model. 
4.4.4 System Architecture 
This section presents the architecture of the hosting mechanism, specifically 
design for the intelligent malware detection framework. It caters for the needs of 
every individual module of the framework, identified and discussed in the 
previous chapter and provide the most relevant and reliable mechanism. We 
have used AWS (Amazon Web Services), the cloud platform of Amazon to design 
the hosting mechanism. As discussed in the previous section, the framework 
might require flexible storage and computing resources that can dynamically 
scale up and down along with internet connectivity to connect with external APIs 
used in the framework. Amazon provides cloud services that are extremely 
relevant in this scenario and are convenient when it comes to scalability. Earlier 
in this chapter, we discussed the building blocks that we have used to design the 
hosting model, we now discuss how we have used those building blocks. 
The three building blocks discussed earlier are combined to build this hosting 
model. There are two phases in proposing this architecture; we first discuss the 
design and implementation of this model, and in the second phase we deployed 
the framework on the model designed. The model is based on a client/server 
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architecture and in this scenario server is the primary component because only 
this component hosts the framework. 
4.4.4.1 Server 
Figure 4.2 presents the high level of architecture of the hosting model, which 
illustrate the components of Amazon’s cloud computing platform that are linked 
together to host the complete framework. Each unique component of the cloud 
platform is expected to host one or more components of the malware detection 
framework. The three components of AWS; SQS, EC2, EFS host queues, 
detection engine, and repositories respectively. The framework presented in the 
previous chapter in Figure 3.5, supposedly doesn’t require any queues but to 
implement the framework to be used and evaluated in real-time, it is required that 
the framework should be able to receive requests and send responds to either 
local or remote clients. To make the hosting model efficient in terms of 
performance, we introduced queues to manage the large number of requests 
coming from multiple client, allowing the hosting model to be scalable 
dynamically. There are multiple queues presented in Figure 4.2 [106], which 
illustrate the dynamic behavior of the hosting model. The first three queues from 
Q1 to Qn are the request queues and R is the response Q, which makes the 
overall queues four. However, if there is only one remote client connected to this 
cloud-based framework then there are only two queues one for request and one 
for response. The architecture is designed to be dynamically scalable and can 
cater many clients without manually changing anything in the hosting model. 
Therefore, if the number of clients trying to couple with the framework hosted on 
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the cloud hosting model, the number of queues will dynamically increase based 
on the number of requests sent by the clients.  
 
Figure 4.2: High Level Architecture 
The analysis and classification modules are hosted on Amazon’s EC2, which is 
mentioned as the detection engine in Figure 4.2. The high-level architecture in 
Figure 4.2, also presents multiple detection engines. Similar to the queues, for a 
single client, one detection engine is enough and even if the single client is 
continuously sending a large amount of requests that might exceed the 
bandwidth quota initially allotted to the SQS and EC2, the initial bandwidth quota 
will dynamically increase without any latency in the service and will subsequently 
be reduced to the initial level when the number of requests will reduce. Similarly, 
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if the number of clients increase significantly, the number of detection engines 
will also increase dynamically.  
There are three repositories in the framework; clean files repository, malicious 
files repository, and analysis repository. All these repositories are held separately 
in a single repository hosted on Amazon’s EFS. The elastic file system, as the 
name suggests, can expand and contract as required based on the number of 
files stored. The requirements of these repositories vary based on the number of 
files stored and don’t always require huge storage capacity on the cloud-based 
storage that why EFS is a perfect choice. Unlike, detection engine and queues, 
repositories don’t require multiple instances if number of clients, or requests 
increase even significantly. Repositories are used just to store and retrieve 
clean/malicious files and their analysis reports and don’t require computation.  
There are two different operational aspects of the intelligent malware detection 
framework; in the first one, it uses a large sum clean and malicious files to 
generate analysis reports and that are used to train and test the machine learning 
algorithms, in the second one, a single file is sent to the framework to get 
identified as clean or malicious. The hosting model accommodates both these 
aspects by using a combination of different building blocks.  
In the first aspect of the framework, as depicted in Figure 4.3, the analysis module 
retrieves the clean and malicious files from the respective repositories and 
generate analysis reports for every file analyzed. In this phase, there is a 
requirement for the analysis module to be running on two active instances 
simultaneously, allowing the module to process clean and malicious files in a 
segregated environment with a much rapid pace. In this aspect, there are 
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hundreds of thousands of files in each repository and to make the process 
efficient, two active instances of this module are required. As discussed earlier, 
Amazon’s EC2 is used to host the detection engine, which contain both analysis 
and classification modules. However, the lower level architecture of the first 
aspect in Figure 4.3 illustrate both the module separately to elaborate their 
individual functionalities.  
 
Figure 4.3: Low Level Architecture of First Aspect 
EC2-based analysis modules for both clean and malicious files retrieve the files 
from the respective repositories simultaneously to perform the thorough analysis. 
Each of these instances of the analysis modules also seek help from a third-party 
private API of Virustotal.com to get endorsement on some of its results. Once the 
analysis is complete, the analysis report generated by the clean or malicious 
analysis module is stored in the respective analysis repository. After all files in 
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both repositories are analyzed, the classification module is triggered and uses 
the extracted features in the analysis reports to train and test the machine 
learning algorithms. Once the cycle of training and testing is complete, the 
classification module becomes fully trained to be used in real-time malware 
detection, details of which are discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Figure 4.4: Low Level Architecture of Second Aspect 
In the second aspect of the framework, the main objective is to identify the 
malicious software in the client. The lightweight agent running on the client’s 
computer sends the suspicious file to the cloud-based server running the 
framework. The request is received by the queue system hosted on SQS, which 
organizes the messages from the clients on FIFO bases and send it to the 
available detection engine. If there is only one detection engine running, then the 
queuing system doesn’t need to prioritize. Once the message, which contains the 
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suspicious file, is received by the detection engine. The file is first treated by the 
analysis module as shown in Figure 4.4 where a thorough analysis is performed 
and assisted by the external API and a preliminary decision is made and the 
analysis report is submitted to the analysis repository, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. If required, the control is then transferred to the classification 
module that uses the machine learning algorithms fully trained in the first aspect 
and classify the file as malicious or benign. Once the decision is made the 
response is sent to the response queue, which sends it to the client. The request 
message sent from the client contains unique client ID along with a unique 
message ID, which is used by the response queues to identify the corresponding 
client. These IDs are also used when the analysis report is submitted and 
retrieved to and from the analysis repository.  
Both these aspects discussed above are part of the same architectural setting, 
the difference illustrated in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 shows how the same cloud-
based components are used differently to fulfil the tasks required by two aspects 
of the intelligent malware detection framework. 
4.4.4.2 Client 
Another module in this architecture is the client module that triggers the second 
aspect of the framework. The client module in this architecture is a simple and 
lightweight agent that works as a service in the client’s system. Unlike 
conventional antiviruses, this lightweight agent is only comprised of four main 
components; a browser extension, process monitor, local cache, and file scanner. 
All four of these components work as a coherent unit and identify suspicious files 
with the help of local cache, requiring quite small amount of CPU resources of 
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the host system. The three components of this module; browser extension, 
process monitor, and file scanner search for files. Local cache is populated with 
the brief information of files, such as; signatures and basic heuristics, which are 
already analyzed by the server in the first aspect. This brief information of clean 
and malicious files helps the lightweight to decide about file’s legitimacy locally, 
without sending the file to the server. Browser extension monitors any file user or 
software is trying to download and checks in the local cache if it is a malicious or 
benign file. If the file is present in the cache as malicious it is straightaway 
blocked, if the file is not present in the local cache, it is sent to the server module 
for further analysis and classification. Process monitor checks all the processes 
currently active and match their IDs against the local cache of malicious files and 
simultaneously sends it to the server for further verification. File scanner scan the 
existing files and follow the same procedure of local identification and then server 
identification. The main reason the client module is lightweight and doesn’t 
require a lot of host machine CPU and storage resources is because it doesn’t 
decompress or emulate the files locally and the signatures and heuristics are not 
stored locally in a descriptive format. 
4.5 Framework Deployment 
In the previous section, we discussed the proposed architecture to host the 
intelligent malware detection framework. In this section, we deploy the complete 
framework on the proposed cloud architecture as discussed above and evaluate 
CHAPTER 4 
116 
 
the overall performance.  
 
Figure 4.5: Amazon Linux AMI 
We chose Amazon Linux OS for the EC2 instance to host the analysis module 
and classification module. Both clean and malicious analysis module along with 
the classification module were hosted on different EC2 instances running the 
same AMI as shown in the Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure 4.6: Analysis and Classification Modules 
As shown in Figure 4.6, both analysis modules and the classification module are 
running on the EC2 AMIs. We launched the EFS and named it main repository, 
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which is further divided into two three sub-repositories; clean file repository, 
malicious file repository, and analysis repository. We then migrated our collection 
of clean and malicious files to the EFS-based repositories with an accumulated 
size of 623GB, as shown in Figure 4.7. In the next step, we set up the request 
and response FIFO queues using SQS FIFO, both these queues are configured 
to dynamically replicate if the overall requirement exceeds. The replication of the 
queues is triggered by the number of requests increasing the threshold level. 
Figure 4.8 depicts the deployment of the queues on AWS console. 
 
Figure 4.7: EFS Repository 
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Figure 4.8: Request Response Queues 
Once all the components of the framework were deployed, we then mounted the 
repositories with EC2 instances hosting the analysis and classification modules. 
The repositories hosted on EFS integrate and operate with EC2 seamlessly and 
work as a component of EC2, which means that after the mounting process is 
completed there is no extra command or process needed to store or retrieve a 
file to or from the repository. The elastic file system allows thousands of EC2 
instances to be connected to a single EFS concurrently with file locking 
mechanism. Therefore, if the EC2 instances are dynamically increasing, they will 
be connected to the EFS based repositories, even if the number of EC2 instances 
is in thousands.  
 
Figure 4.9: XML Request Message 
After mounting the EFS with the EC2, we connected the request and response 
queues with the analysis and classification modules. The architecture uses FIFO 
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queues for request and response, which plays a vital role to prioritize the queries 
sent by the clients and also guarantees that the tasks of identifying a clean or 
malicious file sent by the client is only processed exactly-once. As one of the 
main objectives of this hosting architecture is energy efficiency, it is pivotal to 
avoid processing duplicated messages. SQS FIFO queues have a built-in 
feature, which ensures that all messages are delivered to the destination at least 
once but once delivered, the duplicates of every message are removed. This 
completes the server side connections complete and fully mounted, we now need 
to connect the client(s) with the cloud-based server.  
 
Figure 4.10: XML Response Message 
Although the whole architecture is based on client-server approach, the main idea 
is to make both the components coupled together in a way that all the distributed 
modules work as a single component. We designed lightweight XML messages 
which are sent by the client through the queues and because the queues are 
connected to the analysis and classification modules, they automatically add a 
header to each message defining which EC2 instance is going to receive the 
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message, based on the availability of each running instance. The message 
presented in Figure 4.9 is the request message sent by the queue to the analysis 
engine. The message is in a hierarchical form showing nested child XML 
elements, which contain another job. The jobs are processed as per the hierarchy 
and the task type, which means that the first task in Figure 4.9 is for the analysis 
module which takes the file AccessDatabaseEngine_x64.exe and analyzes it. 
Once the analysis is performed the analysis report in JSON format is stored in 
the analysis repository. Consequently, the same message is then forwarded to 
the classification module because the job ID 2 has the classification task attached 
triggering the control transfer from analysis to the classification module. When 
the message is received by the classification module, the parent elements of the 
XML message are ignored and only the child elements are processed. The 
classification modules retrieve the analysis report of 
AccessDatabaseEngine_x64.exe from the analysis repository, which is stored 
with the name AccessDatabaseEngine_x64.JSON and runs it against the fully 
trained classification algorithms. When the classification module has completed 
the task, it sends the verdict in an XML based response message presented in 
Figure 4.10, it contains three main things from sever; the status of the job, ID of 
the message, and the verdict of both the modules. The status of the job shows 
whether it was a success or a failure, the message ID is for the queue to identify 
the sender and the order in which the message was processed, and the verdict 
is either CLEAN or MALICIOUS based on the classification. Once the message 
is received by the sending client, it looks for the message tag which contains the 
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verdict and if the verdict is CLEAN the file can be used by the user and if it’s 
malicious, the client module blocks and removes it from the system. 
4.6 Performance Evaluation 
The hosting model proposed in this chapter was successfully able to host the 
intelligent malware detection framework and initial messages were sent and 
received. This section evaluates the operational performance of the framework 
while hosted on the cloud-based hosting model. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, there are two aspects of the hosting model, therefore, this section will 
separately evaluate the first and the second aspect based on their operations. 
4.6.1 The First Aspect 
The first aspect of this hosting model is designed to support the training and 
testing of the classification module which relies on the analysis reports generated 
by the analysis module. Each cycle of this aspect retrieves the clean and 
malicious files from the respective repositories and reports are stored in the 
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analysis repositories, which are used by the classification module for training and 
testing.   
 
Figure 4.11: Analysis Module CPU Utilization - Clean 
The start of this aspect of the hosting model revolves around analysis module 
along with clean and malicious files repositories. In this evaluation, we performed 
analysis of 100000 malicious and 75000 benign windows executables stored in 
their respective repositories hosted on EFS. There were two cloned EC2 
instances of analysis module running simultaneously, one for each class of files. 
Analysis is thorough process involving feedback of external APIs and some of 
the files that are bigger in size take more time to get analyzed. Figure 4.11 and 
Figure 4.12 present the CPU utilization graph generated by Amazon EC2 
monitoring tool, which represents the performance of clean and malicious 
instances of analysis module. Cycles for both these modules lasted for about 24 
hours and as presented in both these figures, the highest CPU consumption 
during the clean and malicious file analysis was 19% and 23% respectively and 
that only for a very short period. This clearly shows that the analysis module 
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doesn’t require a lot of CPU resources while performing the most resource 
intensive task. The multiple instances used for clean and malicious file analysis 
manage the load, save time, and consume less CPU power simultaneously. Few 
spikes shown in both Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 are caused by some 
exceptionally large files present in both the repositories, which is in fact not a 
usual occurrence in such scenarios. This shows that the hosting model and the 
hosted framework have the potential to manage resource intensive tasks.   
 
Figure 4.12: Analysis Module CPU Utilization – Malicious 
In the first aspect, after the analysis is performed, the analysis repository is 
populated with a large sum of analysis reports that used by the classification 
module to train and test the classification algorithms. Figure 4.13 presents the 
CPU utilization of the classification module during the process of training and 
testing, it can be seen that the graph is not consistent and there are a few spikes 
reaching up to 43.7%. It can be seen in Figure 4.13, that at the start of this 
process the CPU consumption reaches its highest point and after some time it 
drops. The highest point of CPU consumption show that the training and testing 
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process is at its peak and the sudden drop show the interruption, which is caused 
by the large amount of data extracted from a single file during analysis. The 
classification module further cleans the files and prepare them for training and 
testing. 
 
Figure 4.13: Classification Module CPU Utilization 
After individually evaluating both the modules against the operations of first 
aspect, Figure 4.14 presents the comparison of both these modules in real-time. 
The orange line in the graph is the analysis module and the blue line is the 
classification module. The highest spike in the starting point of the orange line 
suggests that the analysis has started randomly with the heaviest file utilizing 
45% of the CPU and then it dropped to the regular files. The occasional spike in 
this analysis module graph suggest the analysis of heavier files. The blue line 
starts after the analysis module has finished analyzing all the files in the 
repository and takes around 50% of the CPU power to start the training and 
testing process and immediately comes down to 25% right before the 
classification module is fully trained to identify clean and malicious files.  
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Figure 4.14: Comparing Analysis & Classification Module CPU Utilization in 
First Aspect 
The first aspect of the hosting model is more resource intensive as compare to 
the second aspect, which deals with the real-time detection. Even though the first 
aspect hypothetically requires more CPU resources, it reached above 40% very 
few time, based on the type of file it was analyzing. This shows that the first 
aspect of this model, which is required to perform operations in real-time 
environments is energy efficient. Additionally, the on-demand elasticity of EC2 
provides an ideal hosting mechanism for this model. 
4.6.2 The Second Aspect 
The second aspect primarily performs real-time malware detection based on the 
accomplished tasks of the first aspect. The main differences in the evaluation 
environment between the two aspects are; presence of request and response 
queues, requests from clients, single instance of analysis module, and 
classification module with an additional task of providing verdict to the client 
through the response queue.  
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Figure 4.15: Analysis Module CPU Utilization 
To evaluate the performance of the framework and the hosting model for second 
aspect, a large amount of request messages was sent simultaneously to the 
cloud-based framework. The request messages sent from multiple clients 
contained the suspicious files required to be identified as clean or malicious by 
the framework. We used 35 virtual machines running on physical machines, as 
clients to continuously and simultaneously send request messages. These virtual 
machines stored a combination of 93200 clean and malicious files. The main idea 
behind sending these simultaneous request messages was not to evaluate the 
malware identification accuracy of the framework, it was to evaluate how the 
framework and the hosting model perform in a real-time environment while fully 
trained and tested in the first aspect. Figure 4.15 presents the CPU utilization 
graph of the analysis module while it processes the request messages. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.15, the analysis module initially consumes around 19% of 
the CPU but after a while drops to under 1% and then in the middle and at the 
end it hikes up to 4% and 15% respectively. The reason it starts with a 
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comparatively higher CPU utilization is that the files under analysis are newer 
and don’t have any previous analysis history stored in the system, therefore, the 
analysis module is thoroughly analyzing the files. However, as discussed earlier 
in this thesis, majority of the modern malware are variants of old malware and 
that’s why similar type of files don’t require a lot of processing while analyzing 
such files, it consumes much lesser CPU resources. This is also the reason why 
there are hikes in the middle and at the end of the graph.  
 
Figure 4.16: Classification Module CPU Utilization 
Unlike first aspect, in the second aspect the classification module doesn’t have 
to wait for the analysis module to finish analyzing a large sum of files. The whole 
framework in the second aspect works on the basis on individual requests, which 
makes this framework even more energy efficient. Figure 4.16 presents the CPU 
utilization percentage of the classification module while operating in the second 
aspect. As illustrated in Figure 4.16, the classification module started with a 
relatively higher CPU consumption but after a while drops to 1%. Over the period 
of 6 hours it didn’t go above 5%, which happened because the classification 
CHAPTER 4 
128 
 
module is already fully trained and the tasks needed to be accomplished by the 
classification module in second aspect are not resource intensive.  
 
Figure 4.17: Analysis & Classification Module CPU Utilization Second Aspect 
For a thorough performance evaluation of the framework and the hosting model 
in the second aspect we used the same approach of multiple clients with 
continuous request but this time we left the system running for more than 24 
hours. The objectives behind letting the system run for a longer span were to 
identify overall CPU utilization from both the modules, how synchronously both 
modules work, and how the system behaves while operating completely 
unsupervised. The graph presented in Figure 4.17 illustrate the CPU utilization 
comparison of both the modules, the blue and orange line represent classification 
and analysis module respectively. It can be observed from the graph that the 
analysis module is active in the start and after each request the control is 
transferred to the classification module, therefore, classification module graph 
fluctuate. Throughout the graph, there is a continuous fluctuation in both the lines 
which shows how synchronously both modules are operating. Moreover, 
throughout this runtime, neither of the modules utilized more than 2.5% of the 
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CPU resources, which shows that the framework and the hosting model perform 
significantly as the number of cycles per module increase. Additionally, another 
important thing worth mentioning here is that the framework hosted on a third-
part cloud hosting model was running unsupervised for more than 24 hours, 
throughout this period thousands of messages containing a wide variety of clean 
and malicious files were sent from the clients. Many of the files sent from the 
client were quite complex with embedded subdirectories that require separate 
analysis, the sudden hikes in the graph represent the amount of additional 
resources consumed while analyzing and classifying such files but despite such 
scenarios the overall system remained stable and performed well.  
 
Figure 4.18: Lightweight Agent Performance 
The performance of all 35 clients running the lightweight local agent was quite 
similar, Figure 4.18 presents the evaluation results of lightweight agents by 
illustrating their CPU consumption and local detection rate. As discussed earlier, 
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it stores a brief cache of clean and malicious files, which facilitates local detection 
without sending requests to the cloud-based framework. The lightweight agent is 
evaluated based on the number of cycles, in each cycle the lightweight agent 
sent random number of local files as individual messages to the server for 
identification. It can be seen in the graph that the local detection rate in the first 
three cycles is zero, which means that the local agent is sending all the files to 
the server for identification and at the same time it utilizes 7% of the CPU. After 
first three cycles, there is a sudden increase in local detection and the lightweight 
local agent is able to identify 10% of the files locally reducing the CPU utilization 
to 5%. As the framework starts to run in real-time the local cache of the lightweight 
agent gets populated with the brief analysis features making it possible for the 
local agent to differentiate between clean and malicious files independently. 
Consequently, local detection percentage increase with each cycle reaching up 
to 60% in the thirteenth cycle and dropping the CPU utilization to 3% while 
continuously operational for 24 hours.  
These evaluations not only show that the framework and the hosting model are 
consistently energy efficient, it also shows that although the hosting model is 
based on a client server architecture, however, the client can work independently 
to some extent. This makes the system extremely resilient against targeted 
attacks or scenarios where the client module gets disconnected with the cloud-
based framework. Additionally, the accumulated CPU utilization of all the 
modules of second aspect of the hosting model, which runs the framework in real-
time, is much lesser than the CPU utilization of a majority of host base antiviruses 
that are discussed earlier in this chapter. Such features make the proposed 
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framework and its hosting model highly instrumental in both industrial and 
research environments. 
4.7 Discussion 
The intelligent malware detection framework required a flexible hosting model in 
terms of computational and storage resources. In the previous chapter, the 
framework discussed, proved to be extremely accurate in identifying clean and 
malicious files, it focused on the weaknesses initially identified in the similar 
solutions available, specifically; antiviruses. The cloud-based hosted model 
discussed in this chapter has the capability of hosting the intelligent malware 
detection framework proposed, implemented, and discussed in the previous 
chapter. At the same time, this hosting model was required to be energy efficient 
in terms of consuming the CPU resources, unlike the antiviruses evaluated earlier 
in this chapter. The hosting model proposed is based on the Amazon cloud 
platform consuming messaging, compute, and storage services that were 
combined to design this hosting model. The hosting model designed successfully 
hosted the malware detection framework and produced quick requests and 
responses.  
One of the main objectives was to design and implement a hosting model that 
can host the intelligent malware detection framework and at the same time be 
energy efficient. The energy efficiency in this context means that wherever the 
framework is hosted it should utilize minimum CPU resources possible. The 
client-server based architecture, where the server is based on the Amazon’s 
cloud and the client is a lightweight agent running on the host machine, did prove 
to be energy efficient based on the evaluations performed. The first aspect of the 
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hosting model which can be called the initial configuration of the whole system to 
support the second aspect, consumed comparatively higher CPU resources as 
compared to the second aspect. However, the high CPU consumption by both 
analysis and classification module, which marked between 40 to 50%, was only 
for a short period of time and only once in the twenty-four-hour span. Whereas, 
the second aspect, which operates in a real-time environment showed concrete 
evidence of energy efficiency on both, client and server sides of the model. When 
left running for twenty-four hours, the analysis and classification module 
consumed a maximum of 2.5% of CPU resources while stably operating in an 
unsupervised environment. The client module also showed promising results by 
starting with 7% CPU consumption and 0% local detection, which later reached 
3% CPU consumption and 60% local detection in fifteen cycles of running in a 
twenty-four-hour span.  
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Figure 4.19: Comparing Hosted Framework with Antiviruses 
In the final test, we compared the hosting model with antiviruses evaluated earlier 
in this chapter by running them simultaneously against the same repository of 
clean and malicious files, both the compared entities were left running for five 
hours and an average was taken every thirty minutes. The purpose of this 
evaluation was only to compare the CPU utilization of the proposed hosting 
model against the major antiviruses in the market. We only compared the second 
aspect of the hosting model because of its real-time application. The graph 
presented in Figure 4.19 shows the average CPU utilization of eleven antiviruses 
and the average of accumulated CPU utilization of client and server modules of 
second aspect. It can be observed from the values illustrated in the Figure 4.19 
that the average CPU utilization of antiviruses is between 30 and 35% continuous 
for five hours. Whereas, the maximum combine CPU utilization of the second 
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aspect is 5% and that too in the first hour. The proposed hosting model along 
with the malware detection framework has shown significant efficiency in 
managing the CPU consumption. In the first hour of evaluation, the proposed 
system did reach a maximum of 5% CPU utilization but in the later hours 
consumption dropped to 3%. The first two hours of evaluation the average 
consumption was 5 and 3% respectively but the later three hours were 
significantly more energy efficient and the overall average was 1.26%. However, 
like the previous evaluation, there was no significant change in the CPU utilization 
of antiviruses during the five hours of evaluation and the utilization fluctuated 
between 30 and 32%.  
The proposed hosting model proved to be extremely energy efficient, especially 
when compared with the major antiviruses. Along with being energy efficient, this 
hosting model is categorically quick in responding to the request messages from 
the clients, if clients send the request and couldn’t differentiate between a clean 
and malicious file locally.  
Although, the hosting model has fulfilled the primary objectives behind its design, 
there are some weaknesses that could be resolved to make the overall hosting 
model industrial scale. The client module currently has limited functionality and 
cannot scan the complete filesystem of a computer, we were able to identify the 
files in a limited filesystem to evaluate the framework and the hosting model but 
in an actual real-time environment, this lightweight client module wouldn’t be able 
to identify the malicious files hidden deep in the filesystem of a computer. 
Additionally, the current structure of the client module doesn’t allow it to be used 
in a networked environment and only supports individual computers, we were 
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able to run it on 35 separate machines but running on separate machines in a 
network is not quite efficient. A better approach would be to make the client 
module a lightweight network service that is supported by the cloud-based 
framework, which has the capability of scanning ports and other exposed 
vulnerabilities of a network or a single machine in a network. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The growing number of malware attacks on enterprise and general users, raises 
concern over the presence of several security software to protect one system. 
The financial damages caused by such attacks are continuously rising, recent 
catastrophic attacks by Mirai, WannaCry, and Petya are few of many instances 
where security software and organizations were penetrated by the techniques 
used by these modern malware [7], [3], [5]. The present commercial antiviruses 
are good in detecting known malware but when it comes to newly released 
malware or a completely evolved version of previously known malware, the 
conventional detection techniques used by antiviruses become obsolete. As the 
information flow is increasing significantly, there is a need for better security 
mechanisms that can accurately detect known and unknown malware and their 
infection.  
Additionally, another drawback of conventional antiviruses is the CPU resources 
they consume while running in scan mode. The percentage of CPU resources 
commercial antiviruses consume is significantly high, most of these antiviruses 
consume 35 to 50% of CPU resources while scanning the host system for 
infections [18]. Along with the scarcity in detection capability, this high resource 
consumption makes the host system more vulnerable against advanced threats 
by leaving the system with less resources for other high priority services.  
Using machine learning techniques to identify malicious activity in a system or in 
a network have proved to be quite effective [121], [120], [105], [93], [109]. The 
framework proposed in this study approaches both the problems; a) accurately 
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identifying malware, and b) energy efficiency. The intelligent malware detection 
framework used machine learning techniques to enhance the malware detection 
rate and a cloud-based hosting model to support the operational requirements of 
the framework.  
The framework is built around the heuristics generated by the analysis module 
through a bespoke feature extracting tool, which extracts a comprehensive set of 
features from a file through statically analysing it [106]. These heuristics are used 
to train the machine learning algorithms for accurately differentiating between 
clean and malicious files. We used decision trees, SVM, and then applied 
boosting on decision trees to improve the performance of weak classifiers. The 
analysis module can eliminate the obfuscated parts found in a malware to avoid 
any inaccurate information in the generated heuristics [106].  
We designed multiple experiments to test our proposed framework from different 
perspectives. We tested our techniques against a dataset of malicious and clean 
files and applied ten-fold cross-validation followed by above mentioned machine 
learning algorithms for an unbiased set of experimental results. We used 150000 
malicious and 87000 benign executables for training and testing.  
SVM performed better than decision tree but applying boosting on decision tree 
improved the performance by generating the best result of 0.9969 area under the 
ROC curve. To evaluate the framework against much difficult dataset, we used a 
dataset of obfuscated malware, using the training of previous experiment. In the 
obfuscated experiment, boosting on decision tree generated 0.9910 area under 
the ROC curve. This not only proves the better performance against a difficult 
dataset of advanced malware, it also suggests that previous training was enough 
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to detect a different set of malware making it close to real-time detection. The 
real-time detection generated 0.9963 area under the ROC curve.  
The performance of the framework was tested after deploying it on the hosting 
model, which evaluated both; framework and the hosting model. In this 
experiment, we initially evaluated the resource consumption of the framework 
while doing a thorough analysis along with training and testing of the algorithms. 
In this aspect, which was tested for 24 hours, there were two instances that the 
resource consumption went 40% to 50% while performing the analysis and 
training/testing of algorithms. Apart from this instance, the CPU utilization was 
under 10%.  
We evaluated the real-time performance of the framework and the hosting model. 
In this evaluation, we tested the performance of the lightweight client agent along 
with the server side of the hosting model and how it caters the requirements of 
the framework. The fully trained and tested framework was left running for more 
than 24 hours and 35 separate clients were recursively sending clean and 
malicious files to be tested. The maximum combine CPU utilization of both 
lightweight agent and server side of hosting model was 5% in the first hour which 
later dropped to 3% in the next 3 hours and 1.26% in the rest of 20 hours of 
evaluation, while running in scan mode. These results show significant 
improvement as compared to the commercial antiviruses that on average 
consume 32% while running in scan mode.  
Finally, we evaluated the individual performance of the lightweight client agent to 
identify local detection rate and CPU resource consumption of the host machine. 
In the initial cycles, the lightweight client agent consumed 7% of CPU resources 
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while sending all the files to the server for detection. After three cycles, the local 
agent started detecting 10% of the malware locally while consuming 5% of the 
CPU resources. After running it for fifteen cycles, this lightweight agent was 
detecting 60% of the files locally while consuming merely 3% of the CPU 
resources. 
5.1 Limitation and Challenges 
The proposed framework along with its hosting model not only presents 
promising results with enhanced malware detection abilities, it has the potential 
to provide an alternate platform for personal and enterprise level computer 
security. However, there are certain limitations and challenges that are required 
to be eradicated to make this framework ready to be adopted.  
One of the fundamental things in this framework is the type of files it can analyse, 
which was mentioned in the start of this research that the framework only 
considers PE or .exe file format. This makes the framework limited to work for 
Windows based environments only and unable to analyse or identify another 
format of file. The intelligent malware detection framework relies on the heuristics 
generated by the analysis module to train the machine learning algorithms. 
Therefore, by making the analysis module to also identify and analyse non-PE 
based files along with adding some heuristics in algorithms, will make the entire 
framework capable of operating in broader domains.  
Although, the framework can operate independently in real-time, which is also 
discussed in the evaluation of the framework and hosting model, the entire 
framework is not completely autonomous. The first aspect of the framework 
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requires the algorithms to be trained and tested to make real-time detection 
possible, however, this step is performed by manually storing large sets of clean 
and malicious files in their respected repositories, which are later used to 
generate heuristics. To make the system perform independently in long term 
against modern malware, it requires constant update of heuristics, which can be 
done by adding automated heuristics update from third-party APIs or honeypots.  
The evaluation of the framework presents effective results in malware detection, 
which can be enhanced by constantly updating several heuristics and patterns. 
However, if previously unknown malware are successful in proliferating their 
variants then understanding their behaviour is the key to identify and block their 
entire network. This can be done by dynamically analysing malware, which is a 
resource intensive tasks and currently replaced by static analysis in our 
framework. A better approach will be to add a module in the hosting model that 
can cater the needs of a sandbox environment for dynamic analysis. This 
approach will be much energy efficient in terms of accommodating dynamic 
analysis processes.  
Another limitation specifically in the hosting model is that it can only cater 
individual machines. This allow each client to be directly connected to the server 
but at the same time in a networked environment it can be time consuming. 
Lightweight client agent requires to be enhanced to work in a networked 
environment autonomously. 
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5.2 Future Work 
The main objectives behind proposed framework were to overcome the problems 
currently faced by the users of commercial antiviruses by enhancing the malware 
detection rate and making the entire process less resource intensive. The 
proposed framework satisfies all the requirements initially defined, however, 
there are certain aspects that can be enhanced to make this framework suitable 
for different environments.  
The current framework is hosted on a client/server architecture where client is a 
lightweight service and the server is hosted on a cloud-based hosting model. 
Currently the cloud-based framework has the ability to be scaled to support a 
large number of clients but the client module only support individual computers 
separately. This can be enhanced in future to support large enterprise networks 
with heterogeneous devices. This enhancement should only be successful if the 
initial idea of energy efficiency is followed, which is possible with the help of 
service replication [133]. The lightweight host agent can be replaced by a network 
service that replicates the framework hosted on the cloud. The replicated services 
will hypothetically consume similar resources as the current lightweight agent but 
to make it more efficient, dynamic server allocation can be used [134]. This idea 
is adopted from P2P botnets that change their domain dynamically after regular 
intervals and each of these domains are not malicious servers [135], in fact, the 
new domain is a legitimate network node making it extremely hard to stop [136]. 
The services of the entire framework can be replicated on dynamically allocated 
nodes with the help of open-source service replication tool, such as; Zookeeper 
that can replicate the services with limited resources [137] [138].  
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As mentioned, the idea is to make the framework appropriate for the modern 
enterprise networks with heterogeneous devices, such as; smart phones, 
laptops, and other smart devices with a diverse set of operating environments. 
By making the framework recognize and analyse different file formats, we will be 
able to make it support a heterogeneous environment. The current hosting model 
is capable of providing services for multiple large enterprise networks and it can 
scale if required.  
The current framework performs very well against obfuscated malware but as 
discussed earlier malware are rapidly evolving, therefore, it is required to rapidly 
evolve the malware detection mechanisms. One of the best solution is to make 
the anomaly heuristics more elaborative by adding behavioural patterns of 
malicious software, which can be achieved by dynamically analysing malware. 
Third-party APIs can be used to perform the dynamic analysis on new and more 
obfuscated malware samples to generate a much thorough set of heuristics [76]. 
This will make the framework more resilient against modern and more 
complicated malware.  
The future directions mentioned in this section are not only the aspects in which 
the proposed framework can be enhanced. Different enhancements discussed 
can open a new paradigm in security making it more open, resilient, and cross-
platform. One of the primary reasons malware are successful against security 
systems is that they rely on open-source rather than proprietary. The diverse set 
of heuristics generated through static and dynamic analysis, as suggested in this 
section, can support security research community along with making malware 
identification more efficient.  
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